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I. INTRODUCTION
From 1820 until the mid-1840s the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals, the state's highest court during that period, judicially nullified
state statutes that restricted the emancipation of slaves. The
proemancipation thrust of these judicial decisions and the an-
tiemancipation directives of the statutes the court interpreted reveal
both the complexity of Southern discourse on slavery and race rela-
tions and the conflicting forces at work in Southern antebellum society.
In addition, the extended debate between the state's appellate court
and the legislature improves our understanding of nineteenth-century
jurisprudence and the roles played by the judiciary and the legislature
in the law-making process.1
The central slavery questions confronting judges and legislators of
the time were whether the institution should be continued and, if so, in
what form. The emancipation issue compelled lawmakers to confront
the morality of slavery and the prospect of an interracial society in
which blacks greatly outnumbered whites. As legislators responded by
passing anti-emancipation laws that made slavery increasingly repres-
sive, judges openly nullified the statutes to implement reform.
2
These judicial decisions were made at a time when it is difficult to
imagine that the legislature would tolerate opposition to its will. Yet
the judges, all of whom were appointed by the legislature, were neither
censured nor removed, even when the legislature had the clear oppor-
tunity and authority to act.
During the period in which the judges decided in favor of emanci-
pation, strident calls for abolition emanated from both the North and
the South. The ever-present fear of slave revolt was made real by the
slave insurrection led by Denmark Vesey in 1822. Race war was, as de
Toqueville said, "a nightmare constantly haunting the American imagi-
nation."' The abolitionist movement and the occurrence of slave insur-
rections strengthened the arguments of those who believed that the
preservation of slavery depended on the enactment of repressive laws.
Strong economic arguments also existed for strengthening the
chains of bondage. In the early 1800s South Carolina experienced an
extended economic depression. As the price of short-staple cotton
plummeted and banks failed, many planters stood on the brink of eco-
nomic ruin. Slave property held its value, however, and for many, the
income from the natural increase of slaves made the difference between
1. See infra notes 68-192, 221-28 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 68-192 and accompanying text.
3. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 329 (J. Meyer & H. Lerner ed.
1966).
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solvency and bankruptcy. As antislavery organizations began to mount
their campaigns, many South Carolinians feared that a widespread loss
of confidence in slavery would depress the price of slaves and lead to
the planters' financial ruin. Those who held this view supported re-
strictive legislation to fortify the institution against assault.
4
Throughout the antebellum period, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals actively participated in the discussion about the future of
slavery. Although Court of Appeals judges had widely varying attitudes
toward slavery, their judicial decisions were decidedly pro-emancipa-
tion. The language of the decisions does not suggest that the judges
experienced a conflict between their judicial role and their individual
perspective5 despite the court's flagrant disregard of the legislative will.
To the contrary, the language of the opinions demonstrates that the
judges purposefully attacked the emancipation statutes and resolutely
pursued their objective.6
One might be tempted to argue that a judicial decision in favor of
emancipation was nothing more than a decision to strengthen the slave
owner's property rights and to give him unfettered dominion over his
chattel. That theory may apply to cases in which the plaintiffs were
slave owners attempting to free their slaves. It does not explain, how-
ever, the cases in which slaves claimed their right to freedom over the
objection of their owners.
Despite the judicial assault on the legislative will, the South Caro-
lina Legislature took no action against the judges who decided in favor
of emancipation. During the period under discussion, the legislature
controlled both the selection and tenure of judges. Although the legis-
lature reorganized the courts twice, it did not demote, reassign or re-
fuse to reappoint the judges who had thwarted the will of the legisla-
ture.7 This apparent tolerance, however, was not reflected in the
legislature's institutional response to the judiciary's decisions. Later
statutes eliminated judicially-created exceptions to the emancipation
statutes.8
The purposes of this Article are to discuss the context in which
these cases arose and to suggest some reasons why these cases were
decided as they were. Part II provides a brief history of the develop-
ment of slavery in South Carolina. Part III describes the statutory reg-
ulation of emancipation from 1690 to 1800. Part IV analyzes the regu-
4. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
5. See generally State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 229 (1829) (providing a famous
example of judicial tension concerning slavery in North Carolina); R. COVER, JusTrc Ac-
CUSED 1-7 (1975) (general discussion of judicial tension).
6. See infra text accompanying note 174.
7. See infra notes 160-62, 185-87 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 110-12, 179-80 and accompanying text.
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lation of emancipation, both by statute and case law, from 1800 to
1861. Part V discusses why the emancipation cases were decided as
they were and why the legislature did not remove the judges who de-
cided them. Part VI, the conclusion, discusses the implications of these
decisions.
II. THE HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The history of slavery in South Carolina is as old as the history of
the colony itself. The narrative begins in Barbados, from which South
Carolina's first permanent settlers embarked. In the 1620s Barbados
was a tobacco-growing colony with a labor force consisting mainly of
white indentured servants.9 However, by 1640 Barbadian planters were
growing sugar instead of tobacco. The effects of this change were im-
mediate and profound. Planters found themselves in the midst of a
sugar revolution that created legendary fortunes. In a short time Bar-
bados became the richest of the New World Colonies. 10
The sugar revolution in turn transformed the character of the la-
bor force. As pestilence, extreme weather conditions, and long hours of
back-breaking toil made white labor scarce, the planters turned to
black slavery to fill the void. By 1680 over 40,000 slaves worked 175
great plantations and about 1,000 smaller ones. The number of white
servants had dwindled to 2,300.11 The rapid development of sugar cul-
tivation and of slavery produced a plantation economy in its starkest
form.
[The sugar revolution] soon created a strong and cohesive planter
class, which consolidated the best lands in the hands of a few wealthy
proprietors .... Barbados was the first English colony to gravitate
toward the extreme model of speculative profits, absentee proprietor-
ship, mono-culture, soil exhaustion, a stunted institutional life, and a
white population notorious for its vulgarity, alcoholism, and general
improvidence. By 1712, the colony's white population was hardly half
as large as it had been in 1655; in the same interval, as a result of
heavy importation from Africa, the number of slaves had more than
doubled.'
2
The massive introduction of slaves into the West Indies soon took
its toll. During the second half of the seventeenth century slave insur-
rections were frequent, especially in Jamaica. Caribbean planters
9. E. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM 298 (1975).
10. D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1790-1823, at
51-52 (1975); W. ROSE, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM 156 (1982).
11. W. ROSE, supra note 10, at 156.
12. D. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 51-52.
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quickly perceived a correlation between the number of native Africans
in the slave population and the slaves' likelihood of revolt.1 3 In re-
sponse to fears of slave rebellion, Barbados designed a slave code to
secure the planters' economic and personal safety at the expense of the
slaves' well-being.
The Barbadians who settled South Carolina left the island when
the sugar revolution was well underway and the plantation system had
determined the contours of the island's economy. These early settlers
brought with them visions of vast plantations cultivated to produce
sudden and fabulous wealth. They also brought black slave labor to
make their dreams a reality. The existence of slavery in the new colony
was an accepted fact. The moral questions of slavery already had been
decided by the time the early settlers left Barbados. Their primary
concerns were securing their own wealth and safety, maximizing their
profits, and making their slaves' subjugation absolute.
14
The cultivation of rice in the late seventeenth century changed
South Carolina the way that cultivation of sugar had transformed Bar-
bados a half-century before.' 5 Rice yielded dazzling profits and des-
tined the colony for a plantation economy based on black slave labor.
As rice cultivation became profitable, South Carolinians began to im-
port blacks in large numbers. Soon South Carolina was the only main-
land colony where black slaves formed a majority of the population.6
By 1740, over two-thirds of the colony's population was black.1
7
With the rapid increase of blacks, white planters turned to the law
to resolve the tension between what they perceived to be the colony's
economic and safety needs. As the expanding economy called for the
importation of more and more black slaves, white colonists increasingly
demanded the imposition of restraints on the growing black
population.' 8
The early settlers' success in duplicating the Barbadian economic
experience had important consequences for the development of the
South Carolina slave institution and of the laws that regulated it. From
the outset the development of the institution was shaped by the domi-
nant concerns of the planter class: fear of insurrection by blacks and
an economic need to preserve the plantation economy.
13. W. RosE, supra note 10, at 157. The Jamaican labor system was one in which
slaves were over-disciplined and underfed, while their owners were typically under-disci-
plined and overfed. Id.
14. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 154 (1978).
15. W. RosE, supra note 10, at 159; Phillips, The Slave Labor Problem in the
Charleston District, 22 POL. SCL Q. 417 (1907).
16. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 152.
17. G. ROGERS, JR., A SOUTH CAROLINA CHRONOLOGY 1497-1970, at 8 (1973).
18. A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 215.
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III. EARLY STATUTORY REGULATION OF EMANCIPATION: 1690-1800
South Carolina's slave law developed differently from that of the
other mainland common-law colonies. First, unlike the other colonial
slave systems, South Carolina's slave law was both statutory in origin
and intended to be a complete body of slave law. In these respects, it
resembled Louisiana's Black Code, which followed the civil law ap-
proach of creating a comprehensive body of statutory law to regulate
slavery.19
Second, unlike other mainland common-law colonies, South Caro-
lina's slave law developed quickly. Its key characteristics were firmly in
place by 1740. This rapid development can be attributed to the strong
influence of the Barbadian experience, the rapid rise of the plantation
economy, the numerical dominance of black slaves, and a slave rebel-
lion in 1739.
From the outset South Carolina's slavery statutes reflected the
concerns of large plantation owners in the coastal area of the colony.
Planters from the coastal area controlled the legislature and held the
most important government offices. These coastal planters cultivated
rice and long-staple cotton in the rich, alluvial soil of the region. Often
a single family owned several plantations, but lived on only one. Gangs
of slaves did back-breaking field work in the steamy Southern heat,
directed by white or black overseers. Because the coastal plantations
employed large numbers of slaves, and the owners were often absent, it
is unlikely that the white owners knew black field hands as individuals
to any significant extent.
20
In the coastal regions blacks vastly outnumbered whites. Blacks in
the coastal region were frequently recent arrivals from Africa. They
spoke a foreign language and introduced foreign customs. The low
country planters, therefore, produced a slave code designed to protect
their investments in slave property and guarantee the security of the
white community. The code adopted oppression as its approach to
slave regulation and largely ignored the less restrictive aspects of slav-
ery that developed in other parts of the colony.21
Between 1690 and 1740 South Carolina statutes increasingly re-
stricted a slave's opportunity for emancipation. The South Carolina
19. See generally BLACK CODE OF LOUISIANA (1806). In contrast, slave law devel-
oped more gradually in other mainland colonies like Virginia. See generally 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 46-47 (Tucker ed. 1803).
20. The preceding description of coastal plantations is based on W. FREEHLING,
PRELUDE TO CIVIL VAR: THE NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY IN SOUTH CAROLINA 8-11, 71
(1965).
21. Id. at 11 (depiction of low country slaves). For a discussion of the policies of
the slave code, see infra notes 34-37, 229-63 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 42
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Act of 1690, an Act for the Better Ordering of Slaves,22 is reported to
be the first South Carolina law exclusively devoted to slavery.2 3 The
legislature passed the 1690 Act at a time when the plantation economy
was beginning to take hold in South Carolina. The Act restricted
slaves' freedom of action, gave masters absolute power over their
slaves, and provided owners with compensation for harm to their slave
property.24 More importantly, however, the Act's provisions introduced
an important restriction on the emancipation of slaves. The change in
the law was based on a change in the policy arguments used to justify
slavery.
During the first half of the 1600s the justification for slavery in the
English mainland colonies was that the slaves, whether black or In-
dian, were heathens.25 In South Carolina, as in other colonies, slaves
who converted to Christianity had the chance to become free persons.2 6
Thus, conversion to Christianity presented an opportunity to be free
that, to a very limited extent, made slaves participants in the choice
between freedom and slavery.
The possibility of emancipation as a consequence of a slave's con-
version to Christianity presented the South Carolina planter with a di-
lemma. Converting slaves to Christianity, an act regarded as a moral
22. Act of 1690, 1690 S.C. Acts 343-47.
23. G. ROGERS, JR., supra note 17, at 12.
24. The origins of the 1690 Act are unknown, but it probably was influenced by the
Barbadian codes, as its 1712 successor clearly was. The 1690 Act, which applied to both
Indian and Negro slaves, was very oppressive. Slaves governed by the Act were forbidden
to leave their owners' plantations without a pass, and their houses were searched
monthly for weapons and stolen goods. The penalty for striking a white person (first
offense) was a whipping. The penalty for a second offense was a severe whipping, slitting
the offender's nose, and burning the offender's face. The penalty for a third conviction
'was death. Act of 1690, § I, 1690 S.C. Acts 343. The brutality of the Slave Code's penal-
ties could be attributed, in part, to the general severity of punishments of lawbreakers in
the late seventeenth century. For example, a 1679 Virginia statute imposed the following
punishments for theft of a hog: for the first offense, the thief had to pay 1,000 pounds of
tobacco or provide a year's service to both the hog's owner and the informer; for a second
offense, the thief's ears would be nailed to the pillory and then cut off; for a third offense
the thief would be executed. E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 217. Despite the general sever-
ity of punishments, however, slaves generally were punished more harshly than whites. 1
W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 62.
Under the Act owners were permitted to impose capital punishment as a penalty for
a runaway slave. Act of 1690, § XIV, 1690 S.C. Acts 344. The Act also protected an
owner's rights in his slave property: a third party who killed another person's slave
would be imprisoned for three months and fined fifty pounds. Id., § XII, 1690 S.C. Acts
346-47.
25. See E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 331.
26. Before the 1660s, many people assumed "that Christianity and slavery were
incompatible. Negroes and Indians held in slavery who could prove that they had been
baptized sometimes sued for their freedom and won it." Id.
1991]
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and social good, threatened the owner's economic interest in his slave
property. The South Carolina Act of 1690 resolved this dilemma by
justifying slavery on the basis of race instead of heathenism and by
abolishing the slaves' opportunity to become emancipated by conver-
sion to Christianity. 7 Although the stated policy of similar laws in
other colonies was to encourage planters to Christianize their slaves,28
it seems more than a coincidence that this important route to freedom
was eliminated just as the plantation economy began to flourish in
South Carolina. This change eliminated the slave's limited opportunity
for self-determination and made the owner's power over the emancipa-
tion of slaves absolute.
In 1712 the South Carolina Legislature enacted a slave code that
was more restrictive than the Act of 1690.29 Largely a copy of the
Barbadian Slave Code,30 it explicitly equated slavery with race.31 Like
its predecessor, the Act of 1712 was designed to perpetuate slave labor
for the development of the plantation economy and to provide for the
physical security of the white community.32 The Act of 1712 required
emancipation of slaves to be based on merit. Emancipation could be
effected by the Governor, by an act of the legislature, or by the slave's
owner.
33
The Act of 173534 imposed further restrictions on emancipation. It
required owners who freed their slaves to ensure that the former slaves
left the colony within six months after the emancipation. Former
slaves who remained in South Carolina longer than six months, or who
returned to South Carolina within seven years were returned to slav-
ery." Later, the South Carolina Legislature passed the Act of 1740,36 a
27. Act of 1690, § II, 1690 S.C. Acts 352-53.
28. According to St. George Tucker, Virginia had passed a similar act in 1667 to
encourage slave owners to Christianize their slaves. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at
45.
29. Act of 1712, 1712 S.C. Acts 352-65.
30. See H. HENRY, THE POLICE CONTROL OF THE SLAVE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 4 (1968);
K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 206 (1956).
31. Act of 1712, Preamble, 1712 S.C. Acts 352.
32. See generally id. For example, slaves were not permitted to leave their planta-
tions without a pass. Id. § II. Branding, amputation of ears, and castration were included
among the punishments inflicted on runaway slaves. Id. § XIX. Owners who refused to
administer the punishments were subject to fines, and penalties could be publicly admin-
istered to the slaves. Id. Slaves' houses were to be searched every fortnight. Id. § III.
Plantation slaves were forbidden to enter Charleston on Sundays. Id. § VIII. All Negroes
and slaves were prohibited from carrying firearms without supervision by a white person.
Id. § V.
33. Id. § I.
34. Act of 1735, 1735 S.C. Acts 385-97.
35. Id. § XXXV.
36. Act of 1740, 1740 S.C. Acts 397-417.
[Vol. 42
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comprehensive law that formed the nucleus of South Carolina's Slave
Code from 1740 until 1861.37 Curiously, although the Act of 1740 was
passed in-the aftermath of the Stono Rebellion, one of the most violent
slave revolts during the colonial period,38 it did not contain any restric-
tions on the emancipation of slaves. Owners therefore could emanci-
pate their slaves by deed or by will. In addition, the Act of 1740 intro-
duced for the first time procedures by which a person who claimed to
be wrongfully enslaved could have a suit for freedom prosecuted on his
behalf by a court-appointed guardian."'
During the period between 1740 and 1800 there was little, if any,
regulation of an owner's right to free his slaves. During this period, the
South Carolina Legislature also periodically restricted foreign slave
trade.40 The legislature generally believed that native-born slaves were
less threatening than foreign-born slaves.
37. State v. Boozer, 36 S.C.L. (5 Strob.) 11, 12 (1850) ("Our fundamental [slave]
code, now time honored, is that of 1740. It was enacted soon after a violent, barbarous
and somewhat bloody servile outbreak at Stono." Id.); see also W. ROSE, supra note 10,
at 56.
38. S. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL
LIFE 286 (1976); A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 192. Higginbotham has described
the rebellion in the following way:
The Stono Rebellion began Sunday, September 9, 1739, approximately twenty
miles from Charlestown. A group of twenty slaves [from the Steno River plan-
tation] broke into a store, stole guns and powder, and killed the storekeepers,
leaving their heads on the front steps. [Having heard that the Spanish had
promised freedom to slaves,] the group moved southward toward St. Augustine
burning and killing whites as other slaves joined the band. The group was seen
by Lt. Gov. Bull while riding on horseback to Charlestown, whereupon he
alerted whites .... The Negroes had proceeded on, dancing, singing, and
beating drums so as to attract more slaves. By Sunday afternoon the group
stopped after having traveled more than ten miles and decided to wait until
morning before crossing the Edisto River. The Negro group, numbering sixty
to one hundred, was met by a group of white planters, numbering twenty to
one hundred, whereupon a battle ensued. The uprising was suppressed by
nightfall according to some secondary accounts. Others show that a small band
of slaves had continued to the southern border and was met by whites the
following Saturday. The colonists were on guard for some time after the rebel-
lion, several moved for better security, and a special patrol was placed in the
area in January. One ringleader of the slaves was not captured until three
years later by two runaway slaves. He was tried and immediately hanged. Mc-
Crady estimates that twenty-one whites and forty-four Negroes died in the
Steno Rebellion.
Id. at 192-93.
39. Act of 1740, § 1, 1740 S.C. Acts 398.
40. For a history of the restriction of the slave trade in South Carolina, see REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SOUTH CAROLINA OF
1857, SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 33 (1857); see also G. ROGERS, JR., supra note 17, at
22, 31, 49.
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An owner's right to free his slaves remained unchanged until 1800,
when the South Carolina Legislature passed the first in a series of acts
that significantly restricted an owner's right to emancipate his slaves.
Several economic, political, and social factors brought about this
change in the law.
IV. THE LAW OF EMANCIPATION: 1800-1861
A. Background to Change
The early nineteenth century was a prosperous time for South
Carolina planters. Rice cultivation flourished, especially in the low-
country coastal swamps where the rise and fall of the tide flooded and
drained the rice beds.41 The swampland also was well suited to the cul-
tivation of long-staple cotton from which fineries such as lace were
made. When the development of the cotton gin in 1793 also assured
the profitability of short-staple cotton, many South Carolinians moved
inland to cultivate the South Carolina upcountry. Thus, from the turn
of the century, the South Carolina economy was based on rice and on
long- and short-staple cotton, three crops that required slave labor.
The federal government, however, outlawed foreign slave trade in 1807,
fourteen years after the invention of the cotton gin had seemingly as-
sured prosperity for cotton growers.4
2
Anticipating the closing of the foreign slave trade, South Carolini-
ans imported more than 40,000 slaves.4' The importation of 40,000
black Africans increased South Carolina's total population of 345,000
by almost 12%. These massive imports may have been regarded as
having a destabilizing effect on South Carolina's black population as a
whole. The situation was very much like that of a hundred years earlier
when the importation of black Africans in large numbers prompted
adoption of restrictive laws.'
4
At the turn of the century, three factors may have encouraged
South Carolina legislators to restrict emancipation: the belief that the
state would enjoy continued prosperity; the belief that white laborers
would not, and perhaps could not, endure the back-breaking toil of cul-
tivating cotton and rice; and the belief that importing large numbers of
black Africans would destabilize the native black population.
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the South Carolina
41. G. ROGERS, JR., supra note 17, at 47.
42. The first large shipment of cotton that resulted from the invention of the cot-
ton gin was made in 1793. Id.
43. Id., at 53-54; IV. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 11.
44. See Act of 1735, 1735 S.C. Acts 385-97; Act of 1712, 1712 S.C. Acts 352-65.
[Vol. 42
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Legislature continued to limit emancipation by passing increasingly re-
strictive laws." From 1820 until the beginning of the Civil War the
justification for these restrictive measures changed dramatically. At the
turn of the century economic prosperity and the importation of large
numbers of foreign slaves justified restrictive measures. After 1820,
however, the laws were passed in response to a broad-based assault on
many aspects of the South Carolina way of life.
In 1820 the South Carolina Legislature passed the second of three
laws that restricted emancipation significantly. By 1820 the fortunes of
the state had changed dramatically. The state experienced what was to
become a widespread economic depression, the antislavery movement
was underway, and there were several incidents of slave violence
against whites. These events contributed to an environment that en-
couraged legislative efforts to make the slave institution secure, includ-
ing restrictions on freeing slaves.
The impact of the South Carolina depression,4s which had begun
in 1819 with a currency contraction, was initially felt by debtors, espe-
cially planters with heavy mortgages. In 1822, however, the price of
short-staple cotton, a product of the state's inland area, began a sub-
stantial decline that continued into the 1830s. During that same period
the cost of living increased dramatically. These problems were com-
pounded by serious erosion of upcountry topsoil, which not only made
increased cotton production impossible, but also caused crop yields of
substandard quality and quantity.
47
The upcountry planters' hope for economic recovery lay in the
natural increase of their slaves, a hope that proved to be well
founded.48 Slave prices, though subject to some variation, remained
fairly stable and profits from the sale of slaves offset the loss of income
caused by the drop in cotton prices. During the decade beginning with
1824, the period of greatest economic crisis, the average price of a
prime field hand varied between $450 and $525, with a decade average
of $485. 4' Thus, the sale of slaves saved many from economic ruin and
the preservation of slavery became the source of economic salvation for
many upcountry planters.
5 0
45. See infra notes 68-179 and accompanying text.
46. See generally W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 26-36 (discussing the effects of
the depression in South Carolina).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 36-37.
49. Phillips, supra note 15, at 436.
50. Id. The low country planters did not experience the desperate plight of up-
country planters during these troubled years. Low country crops continued to bring in
substantial revenues. Rice prices held and luxury cotton declined in price only slightly.
Not all coastal planters, however, escaped the depression. Those with heavily mortgaged
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Skilled white laborers also experienced substantial hardship dur-
ing the decade of the depression, particularly those living in the
Charleston area. Between 1810 and 1820 the number of free blacks in
the total population almost doubled. The growth of the free black pop-
ulation caused greater competition for the few labor jobs. Free blacks
usually prevailed in the competition for these jobs because they would
accept lower wages than whites and because they were believed to be
more subservient than white laborers. 51
During the period between 1820 and 1832 South Carolinians faced
a widespread depression that affected all economic levels. Upcountry
cotton planters suffered the effects of lower prices, declining yields,
and tight credit. The introduction of the steamboat cost Charleston
merchants their upcountry wagon trade. Tideland planters with heav-
ily mortgaged property felt the squeeze of the currency contraction. It
was in the interest of all these groups to make the slave institution
more secure. Slaves posed less of a competitive threat to white laborers
than did free blacks. Slave property also held its value. At that time
South Carolinians owned about eighty million dollars worth of slave
property. Many feared that any loss of confidence in the security of the
slave institution would not only jeopardize that investment, but would
make both tideland and inland plantations valueless.
52
Violent slave insurrections in South Carolina added to the plant-
ers' concerns about the security of the slave institution. These were the
Denmark Vesey Rebellion of 1822 3 and the Georgetown Insurrection
Scare of 1829.54 Many whites were particularly disturbed that among
the leaders of the Denmark Vesey Rebellion were free blacks and
property suffered from the currency contraction, but at least the steady income produced
by their cash crops held out the possibility of economic recovery. See W. FREEHLING,
supra note 20, at 32-36.
51. Id. at 40,
52. Id. at 51.
53. G. ROGERS, Ja., supra note 17, at 59.
54. Id. at 61. Authorities discovered the Georgetown insurrection before the revolt
actually began. Local magistrates tried the slaves involved in the plot and sentenced
them to exile from the United States, never to return again, under penalty of death. See
Kinloch v. Harvey, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 508 (1830). In Kinloch the owner of one, of the
slaves challenged the validity of the proceedings; he claimed that the statute of limita-
tions had expired and that the common-law rules of evidence had not been applied in
the proceeding. To the latter argument the court replied that trials of slaves were not
subject to the common law. The owner also claimed that in cases in which the death
penalty is not at issue the appropriate punishment is whipping or some other form of
corporal punishment and not transportation out of the country. The court rejected the
argument and stated that courts had imposed exile in similar circumstances, such as the
Denmark Vesey Rebellion, and that exile was an appropriate penalty both in situations
in which the court needed to protect the security of the community and in which the
court wanted to impose a merciful or lenient sanction. Id.
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trusted house servants who had enjoyed more liberal treatment than
most slaves. Before the Denmark Vesey Rebellion it had been widely
believed that slave revolts were more likely to occur when the slave
population included large numbers of foreign blacks. The rebellion,
however, was organized by slaves who in many cases had received rela-
tively good treatment and had been taught to read and write. The
leader of the rebellion, Denmark Vesey, a free black, was a highly liter-
ate, intelligent man who quoted The Bible and the Missouri Compro-
mise as authority for his arguments that slavery should be abolished.
After the insurrection free blacks were regarded as a threat to the slave
institution.
55
During the 1830s, fear of insurrection was fueled by several inci-
dents in which slaves violently turned against their owners. In 1832 a
group of slaves strangled an overseer, a slave murdered his owner, and
another slave murdered his owner's daughter.56 On July 4 of that year,
a slave cook poisoned a Fourth of July feast. Seven people died and
200 others became ill.
57
Slave insurrections were not the only threat to slavery during the
1820s and 1830s. By 1820 attacks against slavery had begun both at
home and abroad. In 1823 the South Carolina House of Representa-
tives considered a petition for the emancipation of slaves. The legisla-
ture rejected the petition because of its expense.5" In 1825 there were
over 220 abolitionist societies in England alone.5 9 The debates in Par-
liament that eventually resulted in the emancipation of slaves in the
British West Indies had already begun. In the United States the issue
of slavery had been raised in Congress during the debates leading to
the Missouri Compromise."0
During the 1830s the agitation against slavery increased. Charles
Mercer of Virginia called for federal contributions to colonize free Ne-
groes abroad. Many South Carolinians perceived Mercer's proposal as
a "first and important step on the road leading to federal control of
slavery and, finally to emancipation.""1 Antislavery organizations were
also being formed in the United States, at first primarily in the
South.62 By 1831 William Lloyd Garrison's antislavery crusade was
55. See W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 53-61.
56. Id., at 250.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 78. (The cost of freeing the slaves was estimated to be $80,000,000).
59. THE NULLIFICATION ERA. A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 18 (W. Freehling ed. 1967)
[hereinafter NULLIFICATION].
60. W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 53.
61. Id., at 196.
62. In 1827 there were four times as many antislavery organizations present in the
slave states as in the free states. D. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 165.
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well underway. Garrison was joined by two sisters who were members
of the Grimk6 family of South Carolina, one of the state's most promi-
nent families. Sarah and Angelina Grimk6 wrote widely circulated anti-
slavery tracts that called for immediate emancipation of the slaves.63
When one considers the effects of the economic depression, slave
insurrections, and antislavery activities, it is not surprising that many
large slaveholders supported legislation to make the institution more
secure, including legislation that restricted emancipation. What per-
haps is unexpected is that during the same period, especially from
1830-1841, the highest court in South Carolina launched a protracted
assault on the statutes that restricted emancipation. The court for a
time accomplished its apparent objective, judicial nullification of the
statutes. Ultimately, however, the legislature prevailed by asserting its
right to have the last word.
B. 1800-1861: Legislative Acts and Judicial Response
From the early 1800s until the beginning of the Civil War the
South Carolina courts engaged in an ongoing debate with the state leg-
islature about the future of slavery and the means of dealing with slave
disaffection. The legislature passed increasingly restrictive laws
throughout the period. The laws, which essentially prohibited emanci-
pation of slaves, reflected a legislative emphasis on the repressive as-
pects of slavery. The courts argued for improved treatment of slaves,
either to encourage them to accept their lot or to effect substantial
reform of the institution itself.
Cases interpreting statutes that restricted manumission-formal
release from servitude-involved emancipations attempted by deed
and by will. In both types of cases the courts usually ruled in favor of
emancipation, especially when the emancipation interests of the slave
were challenged by the slave's former owner or the owner's heirs. 4 In a
few cases the courts did not allow emancipation, primarily when it ad-
versely affected the property rights of innocent third parties.6 5 The few
decisions against emancipation were often made by a single judge pre-
siding in a bench trial.6 6 Juries and the judges of the South Carolina
Court of Appeals consistently ruled in favor of emancipation or upheld
arrangements in which former slaves, although technically not free,
63. 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 634-35 (1960 ed.).
64. See infra notes 72-91, 114-35, 147-58, 168-78, 182-84, 188-92 and accompanying
text.
65. See infra notes 92-109, 136-46 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 92-99.
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conducted their lives in virtual freedom.67
1. The Act of 1800
In 1800 the South Carolina Legislature passed the first of a series
of laws restricting emancipation. According to the Act of 1800, the
restriction was meant to prevent the emancipation of slaves who pos-
sessed a bad character or were incapable of supporting themselves be-
cause of age or infirmity.69 The Act required an owner who desired to
67. See infra notes 72-91, 114-35, 147-58, 168-78, 182-84, 188-92 and accompanying
text.
68. See Act of 1800, 1800 S.C. Acts 440-43.
69. Sections VII and VIII of the Act of 1800 are stated as follows:
VII. Whereas, it hath been a practice for many years past in this State, for
persons to emancipate or set free their slaves, in cases where such slaves have
been of bad or depraved character, or, from age or infirmity, incapable of gain-
ing their livelihood by honest means; to prevent which practice in future, Be it
enacted by the honorable Senate and House of Representatives, now met and
sitting in General Assembly, and by the authority of the same, That from and
after the passing of this Act, it shall not be lawful for any person or persons to
emancipate or set free his, her or their slave or slaves, except according to the
forms and regulations hereinafter prescribed, to wit: Whenever any person or
persons shall intend to emancipate or set free his, her or their slave or slaves,
he, she or they shall signify such intention to some justice of the quorum, who
is hereby authorized and required thereupon to summon to meet, at a conven-
ient time and place, five indifferent freeholders living in the neighborhood of
the person or persons so intending to emancipate or set free his, her or their
said slave or slaves. And when the magistrate and the freeholders summoned
as aforesaid, shall be convened, the person or persons proposing to emancipate
or set free his, her or their slave or slaves, shall produce the said slave or slaves
before the said magistrate and freeholders, and shall answer to them, upon
oath, all such questions as they shall ask concerning the character of the said
slave or slaves, and his, her or their ability to gain a livelihood in an honest
way; and in case it shall appear to the said magistrate and freeholders, or a
majority of them, that the said slave or slaves so produced before them, is or
are not of bad character or characters, and is or are capable of gaining a liveli-
hood in an honest way, they shall give the following certificate, to wit:
We hereby certify, upon the examination, on oath, of A B, the owner of a
certain slave or slaves, named C D, or E, as the case may be, (here describe the
slave or slaves) satisfactory proof has been given to us, that the said slave or
slaves, is or are not of bad character or characters, and is or are capable of
gaining a livelihood, as the case may be, by honest means.
VIII. Be it enacted by the authority aforesaid, That no emancipation of
any slave shall be valid or lawful, except it be by deed, and according to the
regulations above prescribed, and accompanied by the above mentioned certifi-
cate. And furthermore, that every person freeing any slave, shall cause to be
delivered to him or her, a copy of the deed of emancipation and certificate
aforesaid, (within ten days after such deed shall have been executed) attested
by the clerk of the court of the district, who shall record the said deed in the
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free any of his slaves to appear with the slaves before a judge and five
freeholders who, through interrogation, would determine whether the
slaves in question had bad characters or were incapable of supporting
themselves. If the panel decided in favor of emancipation, it issued a
certificate to that effect. The Act of 1800 further provided that "no
emancipation of any slave shall be valid or lawful, except it be by deed,
and according to the regulations . . .and accompanied by the above
mentioned certificate. 70 Consequently, as of 1800, a slave could be
freed by deed only, and not by testamentary disposition. Illegally
emancipated slaves were subject to capture by third parties, who re-
turned them to slavery as if they were abandoned property. Although
the Act of 1800 was superseded in 1820,71 the application of the earlier
statute continued well into the 1830s as cases based on events that oc-
curred early in the century continued to arise.
a. Emancipation by Deed
In every case governed by the Act of 1800 that involved emancipa-
tion by deed the court ruled in favor of freedom. In 1834 the South
Carolina Court of Appeals decided Monk v. Jenkins72 and unanimously
upheld a deed of emancipation that failed to meet the requirements of
the Act of 1800. In 1806 John Fields had executed a deed of manumis-
sion and freed his slave, Judy. The deed, however, was never recorded
and delivered as required by the Act of 1800. The Act expressly pro-
vided that the deed was void if it were not properly recorded .7 In his
will Fields bequeathed certain slaves and other property to Judy.
Fields died in 1817, and Judy died shortly thereafter. Subsequently,
Fields' heirs took possession of the property willed to Judy and the
administrator of Judy's estate sued for return of the legacy.
Judge William Harper, a leading apologist for slavery, wrote the
majority opinion and John Belton O'Neall and David Johnson con-
curred. O'Neall was an advocate of slave reform. Johnson's views on
slavery are not known to the author. Harper concluded that Judy had
been emancipated with respect to her former owner, Fields, and those
respective offices; and that the said clerk shall be paid therefor by the person
emancipating, the sum of four dollars; and that all deeds and certificates of
manumission, shall be void and of noneffect, unless such deed and certificate
shall be recorded within six months from the time the same shall have been
executed.
Id. §§ VII, VIII (emphasis in original).
70. Id. § VIII.
71. Act of 1820, 1820 S.C. Acts 459-60.
72. 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 9 (1834).
73. Act of 1800, § VIII, 1800 S.C. Stat. 443.
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claiming under him. He reported that
Judy had the uninterrupted enjoyment of freedom from the date of
the deed to her death, and was recognized as a free person by the will
of her former owner, John Cato Fields. Under these circumstances
... neither John Cato Fields, nor any person claiming as a volunteer
under him, could dispute the validity of the emancipation, even if
there had been no deed.
7 4
According to Harper, "[a]s between the slave and the master, or those
claiming under him, it is merely a question of individual right.
'75
Harper wrote further that:
Where the master had emancipated the slave in an irregular manner,
it was held that, however the slave might be liable to seizure under
the terms of the Act, the master's property was divested, so that he
could not maintain an action to recover the slave. There can be no
slave without a master, and it follows, that after such irregular eman-
cipation, until seizure is actually made [by a third party], the emanci-
pated slave must stand on the footing of any other free negro.
78
The Jenkins court interpreted the provisions of the Act of 1800
that restricted emancipation as directory rather than mandatory. Ac-
cordingly, noncompliance subjected the parties to some disability but
did not render the entire proceeding void. The owner lost his property
right in the slave, and the illegally emancipated slave was subject to
capture by third parties. But, until any capture occurred, the de facto
emancipation would be given effect.7
Monk v. Jenkins contains two important keys to understanding
the emancipation cases. First, the case stresses that even if a slave's
emancipation were illegal, as between the owner and the slave, the
slave was free. Once a slave was emancipated, even if illegally, the
owner and his heirs lost all property rights in the emancipated slave.
Illegally emancipated slaves remained free so long as they were not
seized by a third party. Therefore, the law's prohibition against eman-
cipation would be given effect by self-help remedies of private citizens
rather than by the court's voiding the emancipation. Second, the court
addressed the competing claims of the owner and the slave as equitable
claims of two individuals, rather than viewing emancipation strictly as
an exercise of an owner's dominion over his property. The Jenkins
court explicitly recognized the slave's humanity. The Act of 1800, in
contrast, dealt with emancipation as an exercise of the owner's prop-
74. Jenkins, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) at 12.
75. Id. at 14.
76. Id. at 13-14.
77. Id.
1991]
17
Smiddy: Judicial Nullification of State Statutes Restricting the Emancipa
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
erty rights.
The views expressed by the Jenkins court regarding the relative
rights of the owner and the former slave were consistent with the ra-
tionale of an earlier judicial decision, ex rel. Sally v. Beaty."8 Sally was
an emancipation case decided by a trial court before the Act of 1800
became law. At the time the court decided Sally, no restrictions ex-
isted on an owner's right to free his slaves.
The case involved a young female slave, Sally, who had been be-
friended by an older woman, also a slave, whose name is unknown. The
woman had received permission from her owner, Beaty, to work for
hire in town with the understanding that she would keep part of the
earnings. Over time the woman saved a considerable sum of money,
over and above the amounts she had agreed to pay her owner. The
slave used her earnings to purchase Sally. Subsequently, the woman
freed Sally.
After some time had passed, Beaty claimed ownership of Sally, ar-
guing that property acquired by a slave belonged to the master. The
plaintiff, Sally's guardian, contended that because Beaty had been paid
all he was due from the slave woman's earnings, the "plain principles
of justice must sanction"79 the slave's act of freeing Sally. The plaintiff
further argued that because the slave, instead of purchasing her own
freedom, had remained in bondage so that Sally could be free, the act
was one "so singular and extraordinary in itself, so disinterested in its
nature, and so replete with kindness and benevolence, that to thwart or
defeat the [slave's] intention, would be doing violence to some of the
best qualities of the human heart."80
Chief Judge Rutledge charged the jury, made up of local freehold-
ers, that "although the case was a new one, . . [he] found no difficulty
whatever in forming an opinion on it. . ". ."'I He hoped the jury would
allow Sally her freedom, because a decision to the contrary would do
"manifest violence to so singular and extraordinary an act of benevo-
lence.18 2 The jury, without leaving the box, returned a verdict for Sally
and she was set free.
Sally prevailed even though the law clearly supported Beaty's po-
sition. The Act of 1740 not only required slave owners to receive "the
whole of the earnings of slaves they hired out, '83 it also prohibited
slaves from owning property or goods in their own right.84 Further-
78. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 260 (1792).
79. Id. at 262.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Act of 1740, § XXXIII, 1740 S.C. Acts 409.
84. Id. § XXXIV.
[Vol. 42
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/3
S.C. SLAVE LAW
more, slaves could not legally enter contracts.8" Nevertheless, the
court's decision implicitly permitted slaves to own property and to dis-
pose of it as they wished. It also enforced two transactions to which the
slave had been a party: the purchase of Sally and her subsequent
emancipation. Sally prevailed because the decision was based not on
the statutory slave law, which would have compelled a contrary result,
but on principles of equity and justice. The focus of the plaintiff's ar-
gument and the judge's opinion was on the humanity of the slave and
the generosity of her act, rather than on the status of the slave as prop-
erty or the owner's legal property rights.
It is clear from the court's decision that the interests of the owner
were not disregarded entirely. The court held Beaty to his agreement
with the slave. Because he had received from her the amount of her
earnings that he had required, the court held that Beaty had not suf-
fered an injury, even though the Act of 1740 entitled him to the full
amount of his slave's earnings. The equities of the case demanded that
Sally should be set free.
In 1835, the year following Jenkins, the court of appeals decided
Miller v. Reigne. 8 The case involved an action in trover for an alleged
slave named Nelly, the daughter of Sam Bennet. Sam Bennet had once
been a slave. During the last twenty years of his life, Sam had lived as
a free person and was recognized as such by both his former owner and
the community at large. In 1814 a woman named Mrs. Peigne pur-
chased Sam's wife, Chloe, and daughter, Nelly, for Sam. Thereafter,
Nelly and Chloe lived with Sam. When Mrs. Peigne died in 1821, her
son, the administrator of her estate, presented Sam Bennet with a bill
for the price paid for Chloe and Nelly. Although the bill presented to
Bennet apparently remained unpaid, Peigne did not sue Bennet for the
money. Nelly and Chloe continued to live with Sam until his death in
1833. After Sam Bennet's death, Peigne seized Nelly and detained her
in the workhouse. The administrator of Sam Bennet's estate brought
an action in trover against Peigne and others holding Nelly.
87
At trial, the jury found for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed,
claiming that Sam Bennet's emancipation had not complied with the
Act of 1800, and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that Sam
Bennet had a property right in his daughter.
88
The court of appeals, in a decision written by Judge O'Neall,
unanimously upheld the jury's verdict for the plaintiff. On the first is-
85. Id. § XXXIII.
86. 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 592 (1835). The surnames of two of the defendants in the case
were Reigne and Peigne. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 593.
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sue the court ruled that the lapse of twenty years during which Sam
Bennet acted as a freeman raised a presumption of emancipation ac-
cording to law, and that the jury's verdict gave legal effect to the pre-
sumption. The court chose not to apply the presumption mandated by
the Act of 1740 which provided that in suits testing whether a person
was a slave or free person, the person was presumed to be a slave.""
Furthermore, the court found persuasive the facts that Mrs. Peigne
had purchased Nelly and her mother for Sam and that Nelly had been
in Sam's possession for several years before his death. Mrs. Peigne, for-
merly an owner of Nelly, had acted in a manner inconsistent with her
son's later claims to NellyY° Consequently, the defendants were found
liable for wrongful detention of Nelly. Miller v. Reigne reinforced the
Monk v. Jenkins decision, which held that a lapse of time during
which a former slave lived as a free person raised a presumption that
the person had been legally emancipated.
Monk v. Jenkins and Miller v. Reigne both involved emancipa-
tions that were accomplished during the lifetimes of the former owners.
In each case the owner was held to have relinquished all rights in his
slave property even though the emancipation did not comply with the
Act of 1800. When the emancipation rights of the slave confficted with
the property rights of the owner, the slave won. For cases involving the
property rights of innocent third parties, however, the outcome was
less certain. This point is demonstrated by Bynum v. Bostick.91
b. Testamentary Emancipation
Bynum v. Bostick, unlike Monk v. Jenkins and Miller v. Reigne,
involved emancipation by testamentary disposition, a method forbid-
den by the Act of 1800. Bynum also involved the property rights of
creditors of the deceased.
Bynum is one of two known cases decided between 1812 and 1842
that ruled against emancipation.92 It was later overruled, however, by
the South Carolina Court of Appeals. Chancellor Henry William De
Saussure, a distinguished jurist who was later referred to as the Kent
89. See Act of 1740, § I, 1740 S.C. Acts 398.
90. Miller, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 593-94.
91. 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 266 (1812). Two other cases, which arose during the first two
decades of the nineteenth century, dealt with whether slaves in South Carolina who
claimed to be free had been liberated properly in their home states: Coleman v. Guard-
ian of a Free Negro Named Ben, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 485 (1803) (the court upheld a finding
in favor of freedom) and Maverick v. Stokes, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 511 (1803) (the court
granted a motion for new trial after a jury found in favor of freedom).
92. The other case is Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 632 (1830).
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of South Carolina,93 decided Bynum in the chancery court.
In Bynum the testator devised real and personal property to
named trustees to be held in trust for his slave, Betsey, and her chil-
dren. The testator further directed the trustees to emancipate Betsey
and her children. The slaves, however, had been mortgaged to secure a
debt of the testator and upon his death, the creditor enforced his
rights by selling the slaves to pay for the debt. The action was brought
to determine whether the slaves had been emancipated under the will
and whether the bequests to the slaves were valid. The court decided
against the slaves on both issues.
9 4
The case is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the result seems
consistent with the policy of a slave society that was beginning to feel
economic, social, and political pressure to secure the institution. Sec-
ond, the judicial method is very different from the ex rel. Sally v.
Beaty and Monk v. Jenkins decisions prior to and subsequent to
Bynum. In Sally and Jenkins, the courts' analyses emphasized the eq-
uities involved in the particular situations. There was little or no anal-
ysis of the statutory requirements. The Bynum court, in contrast, spe-
cifically referred to the Act of 1800 and found its express language
determinative. The Bynum court held the attempted emancipation in-
valid because the statute forbade emancipation other than by a deed
executed during the lifetime of the master.95 Chancellor De Saussure
characterized the testator's bequest of the slaves to a trustee with a
direction to free them according to law as an untenable attempt to
evade the statutory requirements. The court further held the devises
and bequests to slaves invalid because slaves were legally incapable of
taking property by descent or purchase.97
Chancellor De Saussure did not discuss the equities of the case,
even though the case was decided in a court of chancery. De Saussure's
deference to the statutory law contrasts strikingly both with the meth-
ods of his predecessor and with later emancipation cases decided be-
tween 1820 and 1841. His method anticipates that of the late antebel-
lum period, when judges felt constrained by statutory language and
precedent. His decision in Bynum is relentless in its application of the
law, evoking the harshest aspects of the slave institution-the denial of
promised freedom. As the court stated, "Many cases of beneficent pro-
vision for slaves, are allowed to take effect sub silentio, by the human-
93. 1 J. O'NEALL, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF SOUTH CARO-
LINA 245 (1859).
94. Bynum, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) at 266-67.
95. Id. at 267.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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ity of those interested. But when the law is appealed to, it must take
its course."98 The court's statement suggests a tension between what it
apparently viewed as the extra-legal practice of private acts of kind-
ness toward slaves, apparently common occurrences, and the contrast-
ing strictures of the law. In this case, the court strictly applied the
statutory law.
' Bynum involved the property rights of the testator's creditors,
rights that the court did not hesitate to protect.99 In this regard, the
case is very much like the earlier case of Johnston v. Dilliard,100 in
which the court deferred to the property rights of third parties in the
slave at issue.
Decided in 1792, the same year as ex rel. Sally v. Beaty, Johnston
involved an attempted emancipation by deed, rather than a testamen-
tary disposition. The plaintiffs were Quakers who, as the court stated,
had taken "uncommon pains," including riding over ten thousand
miles, to procure the freedom of several slaves. The slave at issue in
Johnston was a woman named Miley who had been transferred by
Charles Moorman, a resident of Virginia, to his daughter Mary upon
her marriage to John Taylor in 1769. Miley remained in the possession
of the Taylors until 1778, when she was sold to the defendant, Dilliard,
who claimed ownership of the slave.101 The plaintiffs claimed that the
transfer of Miley to Mary Taylor was a loan and not a gift, and that,
because Miley had been freed by deed of emancipation before Moor-
man's death, the subsequent transfer from Taylor to Dilliard was void.
As evidence they presented a deed of emancipation dated May 28,
1778, executed in Virginia, and an authenticated will, probated in Vir-
ginia, which stated that the slaves had been lent to Moorman's chil-
dren and that they were to be freed when they reached a certain age.10 2
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. An interesting comparison may be made between Bynum and the approach
taken by the Virginia Supreme Court in Patty v. Colin, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 519 (1807).
In Colin, the testator, Frances Timberlake, emancipated her slaves in her will. Unfortu-
nately, Mrs. Timberlake died with substantial debts. The slaves, as a result, were not
emancipated, but instead the sheriff sold them to satisfy an execution against the Tim-
berlake estate. Writing for the court, Judge St. George Tucker decided that if Timber-
lake's nonhuman property could be used to satisfy the debts, the slaves should be freed.
If the other property were not sufficient, however, the slaves should be sold for a term of
years to pay the debts. If the slaves' entire value was needed to pay the debt, then their
suit for freedom should be dismissed. Judge Roane, in a separate opinion, emphasized
that if the slaves had to be sold for a term of years, they should be declared free after the
expiration of that time.
100. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 232 (1792).
101. Id. at 232-33.
102. Id. The deed freed the female slaves at age 18 and freed the male slaves at age
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The plaintiffs also produced a special act passed by the State of Vir-
ginia in 1783 which sanctioned the Moorman deed of manumission and
the will, "saving, nevertheless, the rights of individuals, who might
have a legal claim on any of the negroes in question.
10 3
Dilliard T10 argued the importance of upholding gifts made in con-
sideration of marriage, particularly when, as here, the slave in question
had remained in the daughter's household for almost nine years with-
out objection by the father and before the deed of manumission had
been executed. The defendant also argued that the special act of the
Virginia Assembly had expressly included a clause that protected the
rights of third parties. In his charge to the jury, Judge Bay emphasized
both the policy of upholding gifts in consideration of marriage and the
acquiescence on the part of the father. He concluded that "the deed of
manumission was utterly void in law" with respect to the slave
Miley.
10 5
Judge Bay's approach in Johnston v. Dilliard can be explained by
the competing interests at stake. In ex rel. Sally v. Beaty, Monk v.
Jenkins, and Miller v. Reigne, the interests of a black slave were op-
posed to those of the white owner, or someone claiming through him.
The rights of innocent third parties were not involved. The courts and
juries did not hesitate to defeat the expectations of the owner when to
do otherwise would be unjust to the slave, even though the owner's
claims were justified by statute. In Johnston, however, two strong pol-
icy interests prevented the emancipation of the slave. The first, clearly
the dominant one, was the policy interest in upholding gifts made in
consideration of marriage. The second was the interest in protecting
the property rights of an apparent bona fide purchaser.
Johnston, however, did not compel the decision reached in Bynum
v. Bostick. Chancellor De Saussure could have reached the opposite
result by turning to the 1797 case of Snow v. Callum0 8 for guidance.
Like Bynum, Snow involved an attempted emancipation through a tes-
tamentary disposition. Unlike the Bynum opinion, however, Chancellor
Rutledge's opinion in Snow upheld the emancipation of the children of
103. Id. at 233 (emphasis in original).
104. One of the attorneys for the defendant Dilliard was John C. Calhoun, who, as
South Carolina's United States Senator, would play a central role in the Nullification
Crisis thirty years later.
105. Johnston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 233-35. The final result of the case is unclear.
The reporter's note at the conclusion of the case indicates the defendant prevailed. The
jury's verdict, however, was recorded to be for the plaintiff. Id. at 235.
106. 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 542 (1797). For a different result, see Maria v. Surbaugh, 22
Va. (2 Rand.) 228 (1824) (court adopted a formalistic approach and deferred to the legis-
lative will, thus defeating the attempted testamentary emancipation of the freed slave's
children).
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a slave, Minda. The emancipation was effected through a will which
provided that ten years after the testator's death Minda and her in-
crease would be freed. Minda died within ten years and the question
before the court was whether the children were nevertheless free. Giv-
ing effect to what was deemed, without discussion, to be the clear in-
tent of the testator, the court found that the children were free even
though the mother had died within the ten-year period.
10 7
The presence of the Snow v. Callum case complicates the histori-
cal analysis of the cases. A court of chancery decided Snow in connec-
tion with the disposition of the decedent's property that, the case sug-
gests, was insufficient to pay the decedent's debtors. Although a
contrary result clearly would have increased the assets of the estate
and secured greater protection for the creditors, the court unhesitat-
ingly found in favor of freedom.108 The Snow court gave the slaves'
interests in emancipation precedence over the property interests of the
creditors.
It may be possible to distinguish between Snow and Bynum be-
cause when Snow was decided there were no legislative restrictions on
emancipation. The policy considerations of decisions like Johnston v.
Dilliard and ex rel. Sally v. Beaty, however, presented the court with
opportunities to avoid the harsh application of statutes that restricted
emancipation. In Bynum, Chancellor De Saussure chose not to follow
Snow. Instead he acted to protect the rights of third parties at the
expense of the slaves. Although Bynum clearly was consistent with the
language of the statute and the legislative policies regarding emancipa-
tion, it did not withstand subsequent reconsideration by the South
Carolina Court of Appeals, which expressly overruled it in 1835.109
2. The Act of 1820
In 1820, the South Carolina Legislature passed a law that forbade
private emancipation.11 0 The important term of the act was expressed
simply: "No slave shall hereafter be emancipated but by act of the
Legislature." '' The preamble of the Act of 1820 and its other provi-
sions make clear that it was passed in response to the perceived prob-
lem of a rapid increase in the population of free blacks." 2 This prob-
107. Snow, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) at 543.
108. Id.
109. See Frazier v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
110. Act of 1820, § I, 1820 S.C. Acts 459.
111. Id.
112. The preamble stated: "The great and rapid increase of free negroes and mulat-
toes in the State, by migration and emancipation, renders it expedient and necessary for
the Legislature to restrain the emancipation of slaves, and to prevent free persons of
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lem was undoubtedly highlighted by the doubling of the free Negro
population in Charleston during the previous two years.11
Some of the emancipation cases decided under the Act of 1820,
such as those discussed above, continued to hold owners to the terms
of their emancipation agreements, even when the emancipation clearly
violated the Act of 1820. In other situations, however, courts avoided
the application of the statute entirely by deciding that the former slave
had not in fact been emancipated, even when the facts seemed to indi-
cate otherwise. The cases include emancipations accomplished both by
deed and by testamentary disposition.
a. Emancipation by Deed
In 1831 the South Carolina Court of Appeals decided Linam v.
Johnson,114 which upheld an apparently illegal emancipation. In 1818
the plaintiff, Linam, had purchased a slave, Bill Brock, for $300 in cash
and $600 in promissory notes. Testimony at trial indicated that Brock
himself -had paid the $300 cash and that he had made payments to
Linam on the notes. At the time of the sale, Linam gave the bill of sale
to Brock for safekeeping, and Brock began to live as a free man. Four
years later, in 1822, Brock presented an accounting to Linam. The ac-
counting established that Brock had overpaid Linam, and that money
was due Brock. Linam apparently did not dispute the accounting. At
that time, Brock began paying the poll-tax levied on free blacks who
wished to vote. The following year, Johnson, the defendant, became
Brock's guardian (as required by law)."'5 Claiming Brock was his prop-
erty, Linam sued Johnson to recover possession of Brock. Judge David
colour from entering into this State." Id.
113. See supra text accompanying note 48. The Act of 1820 also prohibited the im-
migration of free blacks into the state. Violators who did not leave the state immediately
were subject to be sold into slavery for a three to five year period. On the other hand,
free blacks who were involuntarily brought into the state and sold into slavery could
recover money damages. The latter provision may have been a response to cases like
Pepoon v. Clarke, 8 S.C.L. (1 Mill) 137 (1817). In Pepoon the employer of a young, free
black servant who had been brought into South Carolina attempted to enslave her. A
guardian who brought suit to obtain the girl's freedom additionally sued for $400 in
damages. The court, denying defendant's motion for a new trial based, inter alia, on a
claim that the damages were excessive, stated:
I cannot forbear to declare my own conviction, that there had been a base
attempt to consign to slavery, for life this unfortunate being, whose very situa-
tion called loudly for the protection of every feeling and honest man. With this
view of the case, I should not have been disposed to grant a new trial, if the
damages had been much greater.
Id. at 141-42.
114. 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 137 (1831).
115. See Act of 1822, 1822 S.C. Acts 461-62.
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Johnson tried the case. A jury found for Brock's guardian, the defend-
ant, and Linam appealed. 116
Judge Johnson was also a member of the appellate panel and
wrote the appellate opinion. The court held that Linam, as Brock's al-
leged owner, could not maintain an action in trover because, by eman-
cipating Brock, Linam had relinquished the rights of property and im-
mediate possession essential to such an action. 117 The court thus held
Linam to his act of emancipation even though the court expressly rec-
ognized that it was void under both the Act of 1800 and the Act of
1820. The court also ruled that the Act of 1820 did not abrogate third
parties' rights, established under the Act of 1800, to capture illegally
emancipated slaves.118 A contrary ruling on this issue would have per-
mitted an owner like Linam, who had illegally emancipated a slave, to
change his mind later, recover the slave property, and thus nullify the
emancipation without penalty to himself. This possibility seemed to
concern the court and, in fact, the issue was raised in a later case.119
The court had decided that Brock was subject to capture by third
parties, and concluded that Johnson's act of becoming Brock's guard-
ian, like capture, terminated all other claims to Brock. The court held
that it was of no consequence that Johnson's act "was not intended as
a seizure or conversion to his own use, but on the contrary, was evi-
dently intended to protect [Brock] in the enjoyment of what he sup-
posed was his right to freedom."120 The decision, arguably, also gave
effect to the contract between Brock and his former owner, a contract
Brock lacked the legal capacity to enter. The court found the defend-
ant in the Linam case had only acted "with the humane view of giving
effect, as far as he could to a contract which the plaintiff had himself
made, upon most ample consideration, and which he now seeks to
avoid.
1 21
Linam v. Johnson is reminiscent, in several respects, of ex rel.
Sally v. Beaty and Monk v. Jenkins. In all these cases, the court en-
forced a contract between a slave and his owner, to the disadvantage of
the owner, even though the slave lacked the legal capacity to enter the
contract. The court's decision in these cases, furthermore, seemed to
rest heavily on principles of equity. Finally, the opinion in Linam, as in
ex rel. Sally v. Beaty, upheld a verdict returned by a jury of men of
116. Linarn, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) at 137-39.
117. Id. at 140.
118. Id.
119. Cline v. Caldwell, 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 423 (1833); see infra note 134 and accom-
panying text.
120. Linam, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) at 139-40.
121. Id. at 141.
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In the 1833 case of Cline v. Caldwel113 the court of appeals af-
firmed per curiam a trial court opinion that permitted an evasion of
the Act of 1820. The rationale of Cline, which upheld a decision in
favor of de facto emancipation, differed from other decisions that in-
volved emancipation by deed. In Cline the former slave was declared
not to have been emancipated, even though he was permitted to go at
large without supervision. In other decisions, the act of emancipation,
though illegal, terminated the rights of the former owner in his slave
property.
Cline was an action in trover for a slave named John. Elizabeth
Cline, the plaintiff, was John's wife and a free black woman. In 1822
John had been sold to a man named Setzler for $650. John paid $300
of the price and Setzler paid the remaining $350. John and Setzler
agreed that John would be freed once he paid Setzler $350. Through a
series of subsequent transactions, Joseph Caldwell and George Suber
each acquired a one-half interest in John. Caldwell and Suber con-
veyed John to Cato Gallman, a free black man. A witness to this last
transaction testified that he saw no money exchange hands when the
transfer was made, but that the buyer, the seller, and the slave were all
present. Gallman subsequently sold John to John's wife, Elizabeth
Cline, and the couple moved to Georgia. Some time later Joseph Cald-
well purported to convey his interest in John again. This time the con-
veyance was to his brother, Samuel Caldwell. Samuel died a short time
later. The beneficiaries of Samuel Caldwell's estate alleged that the
transfers to Cato Gallman and to Elizabeth Cline were void, seized
John in Georgia and claimed him as their slave. Cline then brought an
action in trover to recover her husband.
124
Judge John Belton O'Neall conducted the trial. Judge O'Neall's
report of the trial proceeding stated that he had submitted certain
questions to the jury, two of which were: (1) whether the bill of sale
from Joseph Caldwell to Cato Gallman was void; and (2) whether John
was at any time emancipated contrary to the Act of 1820.225 O'Neall
further reported that "[u]pon each of these questions, I was with the
plaintiff, and so expressed my opinion to the jury."1126 The plaintiff pre-
vailed. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the result, and
Judge O'Neall's report of the trial, in a three line per curiam
122. Monk v. Jenkins, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 9, 10 (1834) was not a jury trial.
123. 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 423 (1833).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 425.
126. Id.
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opinion. 127
In his report of the trial, Judge O'Neall first addressed the issue of
whether the sale of John from Joseph Caldwell to Gallman was void.
Judge O'Neall believed that the deed would be good against the gran-
tor even if it had been intended as an evasion of the Act of 1820. He
compared it with a deed executed for the purpose of defrauding credi-
tors, which would remain good between the parties themselves. To
meet the challenge that the transfer was void for lack of consideration,
he characterized the transaction as a gift and held that it was binding
against the grantor.128 Once again, the equities of the case prevailed.
Wrongdoing parties were held to their bargain, even though doing so
resulted in an evasion of the Act of 1820.
Having found the deed valid between the parties, Judge O'Neall
then considered whether it was void under the Act of 1820. He con-
cluded that the deed was not void. He first advanced the technical ar-
gument that the action was one of trover for a slave, not a claim of
emancipation. He then maintained that even if there had been a secret
trust to avoid the Act of 1820, Caldwell's beneficiaries could not chal-
lenge the deed because Caldwell had been a party to it. Finally, read-
ing the act literally, Judge O'Neall concluded that: "[T]he Act of 1820,
does not declare a deed absolute on its face, but intended as a covert
emancipation void: it simply enacts, that emancipation shall not take
place, but by act of the legislature." 29 According to Judge O'Neal, be-
cause the execution of the deed and bill of sale for John had conveyed
a right of property, "there is, in such a transfer, although made with a
view to future emancipation, no violation of the Act of 1820. '130
Judge O'Neall next considered what type of emancipation would
violate the Act of 1820. He held that emancipation "means parting
with the possession of the slaves, and permitting them to go at large,
and act for themselves." 3 1 He concluded that the act was not violated
until the owner permitted a slave to go at large as a free man without
the control of an owner. John had never been without an owner, even
though he was virtually a free man, because he now was owned by his
wife. Judge O'Neall observed that because John lived with his owner,
"there was as much an actual possession of him as ever does exist be-
tween master and slave." 3 2 John, therefore, had never been emanci-
pated within the meaning of the Act of 1820. The implication of Cline
127. Id. at 428.
128. Id. at 425-26.
129. Id. at 426.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 427 (quoting Lenoir v. Sylvester, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 632, 641 (1830)).
132. Id.
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was that a slave could live in a state of virtual freedom as long as
someone held a deed to him and purported to be his owner.
The state of the law after Cline, particularly in the context of
Linam v. Johnson,133 is worth some consideration. In Linam, as in
Cline, the status of a black person was directly at issue and the parties
to the legal contest were a white seeking to enslave the black and a
benefactor acting to preserve his freedom. The benefactor in Linam
was a white guardian; the benefactor in Cline was a free mulatto wo-
man who was the slave's wife and apparent owner. In both cases the
slave had been emancipated by deed, although not according to the
terms of the Act of 1820. Both courts enforced the deed, effectively
emancipating the slave against the interests of persons who had taken
a role in the emancipation and had profited from the action. The
Linam court found that Brock had been emancipated and that the ap-
pointment of a guardian protected Brock from recapture by his former
owner. The Cline court ruled that an emancipation had not occurred
because someone in fact held title to the former slave. In the absence
of an unequivocal emancipation, the slave could not legally be
captured.
The Linam decision left unanswered the question of whether a
slave who had been illegally emancipated and who had not been cap-
tured by third parties might legally be seized by his former owner.
Cline answered that question. The Cline the court concluded that even
if John had not been legally emancipated he could not be seized by the
former owner who had attempted the emancipation.1
34
As a result of these two cases, the scope the Act of 1820 was sub-
stantially restructured. Its provisions applied only when a freed slave
was permitted to go at large without a representative of any kind.
Emancipators or their representatives were not permitted to challenge
the emancipation or to seize the freed slave. Third parties could not
capture a former slave who had either a nominal owner or a guardian.
It did not matter that the former slave was virtually free as long as
someone, whether black or white, guardian or owner, was, in some
sense, the slave's legal representative. 135
b. Testamentary Emancipation
The 1830 case of Lenoir v. Sylvester 13 was the first known chal-
lenge to the Act of 1820. Lenoir, decided by the South Carolina Court
133. For a discussion of Linam, see supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
134. 19 S.C.L. (1 Hill) 423, 425 (1833).
135. See supra notes 118-20, 131-34 and accompanying text.
136. 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 632 (1830).
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of Appeals, involved an attempted testamentary emancipation. It was
one of few known cases that ruled against emancipation during the an-
tebellum period in South Carolina,137 but its precedential value was
soon diminished by the same court that decided it.
The testator in Lenoir, William Wright, died in 1808. Wright's will
named his wife, Martha Wright, and two friends as executors of the
estate. Wright also appointed the two friends as guardians of several of
his slaves. Wright left Martha a life estate in the slaves. Upon
Martha's death the guardians were to free the slaves.
Throughout her life, Martha Wright claimed absolute ownership
of the slaves, alleging that her husband's attempted emancipation vio-
lated the Act of 1800. She compared her possession of the slaves to a
capture of illegally emancipated slaves. Possession, therefore, vested
full title to the slaves in her. Martha outlived the other two executors
of her husband's estate. In 1825 she purported to convey a remainder
interest in the slaves to the plaintiffs, while retaining a life estate in
them for her own use. When Martha died in 1828, the defendant cap-
tured the slaves. He alleged that they had been illegally freed under
the Act of 1800 and that Martha Wright's claim to more than a life
estate in them was invalid. The plaintiffs brought an action in trover to
recover the slaves. The court held that neither party would be awarded
the slaves and that the slaves would revert to the testator's estate for
the benefit of the residuary legatees. 13s
Judge O'Neall, then a recent appointee to the court, wrote the
opinion of the court of appeals. The first issue O'Neall addressed was
whether the slaves were unlawfully freed by the testator and thus were
subject to capture. He decided that they were not because the will it-
self had not conferred freedom on the slaves. The slaves had not been
permitted to go at large as though they were free, and the executors
had not attempted to free them. The slaves, therefore, had not been
illegally emancipated within the meaning of the act and were not sub-
ject to capture. O'Neall concluded that so long as the slaves remained
in possession of a master, whether as part of a life estate or otherwise,
the "evil" to be remedied by the act had not occurred.1
39
In dictum Judge O'Neall also concluded that the executors, as le-
gal owners of the estate in question, possessed the legal capacity to free
the slaves as directed by the testator. The executors could produce the
slaves, answer the required questions, obtain the necessary certificate
137. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
138. Lenoir, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) at 644.
139. Id. at 641. According to Judge O'Neall, the sole purpose of the Act of 1800 was
to prevent the emancipation of slaves who had a bad character or were unable to support
themselves. See id. at 637-38.
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and draw up the deed of emancipation. Judge O'Neall determined that
the acts of executors would not constitute a testamentary emancipa-
tion because they were independent of the testamentary directives.
140
By finding that the slaves were not free as long as they had a legal
master in any form, and by concluding that executors could emanci-
pate slaves if they followed the requirements of the Act, Judge O'Neall
contributed to the judicial erosion of South Carolina's emancipation
legislation. This type of judicial activism was to become characteristic
of the South Carolina Court of Appeals during the next decade. On its
face, the Act of 1800 required emancipation to be effected by deed dur-
ing the master's lifetime. 141 O'Neall's opinion suggested that emancipa-
tion pursuant to a testamentary disposition also would be permissible,
although this result was not the holding of the case. Only five years
later, however, the court used Judge O'Neall's arguments to support a
ruling in favor of a testamentary bequest of emancipation.
142
In addition to ignoring the language of the statute, in Lenoir
Judge O'Neall also summarily dealt with earlier cases that may have
led to a different result. He said:
I presume, however, that in [those] cases the question was not
presented, whether the executors could not emancipate the slaves
under the act of 1800. If, however, it was made, and the point ex-
pressly decided, yet this Court is not bound by it. Up to 1824, we had
two co-ordinate [sic] tribunals, pronouncing on cases in Law, and Eq-
uity, in the last resort, and often differing in their decisions on the
same legal questions: and it was to remedy this evil, and insure uni-
formity of decision, that this Court was established. In the discharge
of this high trust, it has the unquestionable right to review not only
its own decisions, but also those of the Courts in whose place it was
created: and the decisions of the old Court of Appeals in Equity, al-
though entitled to great respect, as the decisions of wise and learned
men, cannot certainly be regarded as imperative, but when, in the
judgment of this Court, they are clearly erroneous, they must be
overruled. 41
The final result of Lenoir, however, did not rest on O'Neall's find-
ing that the slaves' emancipation had not violated the provisions of the
Act of 1800. Judge O'Neall further ruled that Wright's 1808 will had
not given the slaves any vested rights to freedom. Freedom for the
slaves could occur only if the executors complied with the Act of 1800
140. Id. at 640-41.
141. See Act of 1800, 1800 S.C. Acts 442-43.
142. See Frazier v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
143. Lenoir, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) at 641-42. The quoted language foretold the court's
subsequent 1835 overruling of Bynum v. Bostick, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 266 (1812) in Fra-
zier v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304, 315 (1835).
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and, even then, freedom was not guaranteed. If any right to freedom
was to arise, it would do so only after Mrs. Wright's death. Mrs.
Wright, however, died after the Act of 1820 was passed. This act pro-
vided that no slave could be freed except by act of the legislature.
Judge O'Neall found that the Act of 1820 applied to the Lenior situa-
tion and concluded that the slaves should remain in bondage. The Le-
noir court denied freedom to the slaves in question, but opened the
door to an interpretation of the slave statutes that would permit testa-
mentary emancipation.
14 4
The outcome of Lenoir, at first, is puzzling in light of the court's
later attack on the Act of 1820, and its apparent willingness to give
effect to testamentary emancipations. The particular facts of the case,
however, did not present the court with a ready means of avoiding the
Act of 1820. The case is a study in "what ifs." First, Martha Wright
survived both her husband and the two other executors who were also
the slaves' guardians. The language of the opinion makes it clear that
'had Martha died before 1820, the executors would have been permitted
to free the slaves as directed by the will.
4 5
Once the Act of 1820 was passed, the fate of the slaves was sealed.
The deaths of the coexecutor guardians left the slaves with no one to
speak on their behalf during the court proceedings, or to watch over
them once they were free. The surviving executor, Martha Wright, al-
though she was a guardian, apparently opposed the slaves' release. The
remaining claimants under the will acted on their own behalf to pro-
tect their property interest in the slaves. Finally, the will apparently
did not provide support for the slaves once freed.146 None of the other
cases in which emancipation was effected involved slaves who were
simply turned loose upon society, without a guardian or benefactor, or
without a means of support.
Despite its finding against freedom, Lenoir indirectly advanced
the cause of emancipation. Five years later, the dictum in Lenior pro-
vided, in part, the basis for a decision in favor of freedom.
In Frazier v. Frazier's Executors 47 a will written by James Frazier
in 1824 specified that, upon his death, several of his slaves were to
remain with his widow to provide for her comfort. Other slaves were to
be hired out during the widow's lifetime and the money from their hire
was to be set aside in a special fund. Upon the widow's death, Frazier's
executors were to emancipate the slaves. The money from the special
144. Lenoir, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) at 643-44.
145. Id. at 640, 642.
146. The will simply stated that upon Martha Wright's death, "I give Leah, Esther,
and Letty their freedom." Id. at 634.
147. 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
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fund was to be equally divided among the slaves so that they could go
to Santo Domingo or to some other place to be colonized. After the
widow died, the executors attempted to carry out the provisions of the
will. Frazier's next of kin sued and claimed that the provisions con-
cerning the slaves were void because they violated the Act of 1820.
At the time the court of appeals heard the case, two elements of
South Carolina jurisprudence seemed to require a ruling in favor of the
next of kin. One was the Act of 1820; the other was an earlier decision,
Bynum v. Bostick.148 Although the Bynum decision was based on the
Act of 1800, the facts of Bynum were similar to those in Frazier. In
Bynum the testator had directed that certain real and personal prop-
erty should be held in trust for his slave Betsey and her children. The
testator also had directed the trustees to emancipate Betsey and her
children according to law. The Bynum court held that the bequest of
property to slaves was void because slaves could not take property by
descent or purchase. The bequest of the slaves to the trustees with
directions to free them was also void because it did not comply with
the Act of 1800.
Chancellor Henry De Saussure, the author of the Bynum opinion,
decided Frazier. De Saussure held that Frazier's bequest of freedom to
the slaves was void because it was prohibited by the Act of 1820.148
The testator had not conditioned the bequest of freedom on prior leg-
islative approval. The lower court reasoned that the testator's instruc-
tions to the executors to emancipate the slaves directed the executors
to perform an act the law prohibited the owner from doing himself. De
Saussure's opinion stated:
[O]ur statute [of 1820] forbids the emancipation of slaves, and
declares the act null and void.
The statute is founded on deep policy, and was intended to pre-
vent emancipation of slaves as a great political evil, dangerous to the
institutions of the State, and injurious to the property and interest of
the citizens. I am aware that a statute is not to be enlarged beyond a
fair and reasonable construction of its words and provisions, in order
to give effect to some supposed recondite meaning. But Courts are
bound to look to the real object of a statute, and to give it effect, if
the meaning be obvious and the provisions of the statute sufficient to
cover the meaning. In the case before us, it is quite obvious, the object
and intent of the legislature was [sic] to prevent the emancipation of
the slaves held in the State. A direction to others to do what the
owner is prohibited from doing cannot be permitted to defeat the pro-
148. 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 266 (1812). For a discussion of Bynum, see supra notes 92-
99 and accompanying text.
149. Frazier, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) at 306.
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hibition. Such an easy evasion would be making the statute a mere
cobweb. 150
On appeal, the court of appeals upheld the bequest, with Judge
O'Neall writing for the majority. 51 Judge O'Neall acknowledged that
the words of the Act of 1820 seemed to prohibit emancipation both in
the state and outside the state, and characterized his construction of
the statute as one in keeping with its spirit rather than limited by its
explicit terms. Turning to the preamble of the Act, he determined that
the purpose of the Act was to prevent an increase of free blacks within
the state. Judge O'Neall's conclusion that the legislature intended to
regulate only acts of emancipation within the state, and not emancipa-
tions occurring outside of the state, therefore, would not violate the
purpose of the Act.1
52
Judge O'Neall reasoned that if the owner were alive, he would per-
sonally be able to take the slaves out of the state to emancipate them
and concluded that the executors could do likewise because "[a]s a
general rule,. . . the owner of property may by his will direct his exec-
utors to dispose of it in any way which he could."153 Because this con-
clusion contradicted the holding of Bynum, Judge Q'Neall overruled
the earlier case, and indicated that "that opinion was certainly pre-
pared under strange misapprehension of the law.''5 According to
Judge O'Neall, the misapprehension in question was a requirement
that the deed of emancipation be executed during the owner's lifetime.
After finding that a testator could direct his executors to free his
slaves outside of the state, Judge O'Neall determined the testator's in-
tent by referring to the language of the will. He relied on a rule of
construction that permitted the transposition of words and sentences
to give effect to the testator's intent, and construed the will as though
it directed the executors to take the slaves to a place where emancipa-
tion was legal and to free them there. This construction yielded an in-
tent that was lawful under the court's interpretation of the Act of
1820.115
Judge O'Neall was also able to give effect to the provisions of the
will that bequeathed money to the slaves. He observed that in the will
the bequest of money followed the language that granted the slaves
150. Id. at 306-07.
151. Id. at 317.
152. Id. at 314. Judge O'Neall also expressed the view that limits upon South Caro-
lina's jurisdiction prevented the Act of 1820 from prohibiting out-of-state emancipations.
Id, at 314-15.
153. Id. at 315.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 314-15.
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their freedom. According to Judge O'Neal, the sequence of the provi-
sions demonstrated that the testator intended the slaves to receive
property only after they became free persons. The legacy could there-
fore be upheld. Judge O'Neall concluded the opinion by directing the
executors to take the slaves out of the state to a place where they could
be emancipated legally. 5 '
In Frazier v. Frazier's Executors 57 the court created an important
exception to the Act of 1820. Testamentary dispositions of emancipa-
tion would be upheld if the slaves were to be freed outside South Caro-
lina. It is clear from the opinions of both the trial and appellate courts
that all of the judges knew the impact of these decisions. De Saussure
had warned against "making a cobweb" of the statute.158 Nevertheless,
when an opportunity to decide in favor of emancipation presented it-
self, the appellate judges seized it.
The South Carolina Court of Appeals decided Frazier in 1835, the
same year that it decided Miller v. Reigne 59 in favor of emancipation.
That year, the South Carolina Legislature reorganized the courts by
replacing the single court of appeals with separate courts of appeal for
equity and law.160 Appeals that involved both law and equity and also
constitutional questions would be heard by a full assembly of the
judges of both courts.' 6'
156. Id. at 317. Judge Johnson concurred with O'Neall's opinion. Judge Harper
neither signed the opinion nor wrote a dissent.
In a later opinion, Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 447 (1860), Judge
O'Neall stated that Frazier stood for the proposition that:
[The Act of 1820] could not "have effect upon emancipation beyond the limits
of the State." It is very true my brother Harper, the other member of the
Court, did not sign the opinion, but he gave no dissent, and I happen to know
that his objection was more to the competency of slaves to have such a decree
pronounced in their favor than to the principles of the decree.
Id. at 512.
157. 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
158. Id. at 304, 307.
159. 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 592 (1835). For a discussion of Miller, see supra notes 86-91
and accompanying text.
160. See Act of 1835, 1835 S.C. Acts 334.
161. Id. § 3. At least one South Carolina jurist believed that Frazier, in part,
prompted the legislature's reorganization of the courts. In Willis v. Jolliffe, 32 S.C. Eq.
(11 Rich. Eq.) 447 (1860), Judge Wardlaw stated in dissent that Frazier "was followed in
the same year by the disorganization of the Court which pronounced it, and, as many
believe, served, to some extent, to produce this disorganization." Id. at 525. In other
writings, however, Judges O'Neall and Johnson attributed the reorganization to the legis-
lature's displeasure with the result in a nullification test oath case. Judge O'Neall wrote,
"Upon the announcement of this [McCready] judgment, public denunciation of the ma-
jority came from the press, from the public assembly and from private coteries ....
This, it is believed, was the leading cause which led to the abolition of the separate Court
of Appeals in 1835." 1 J. O'NEALL, supra note 93, at 281.
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The reorganization of the courts presented the state legislature
with a clear opportunity to remove judges whose emancipation deci-
sions had aroused alarm among low country planters. By 1835 these
planters had attained a two-thirds majority in both houses of the legis-
lature. The planters thus had the political power to express to their
displeasure either by removing or failing to reappoint judges. Instead,
however, the legislature reappointed all the judges. At the time the
courts were reorganized, Judges Johnson and Harper became chancel-
lors to hear appeals in equity, and Judge O'Neall was assigned to the
law court. 2
The reorganization of the court did not redirect the current of de-
cisions in favor of emancipation. In 1839 the law court of appeals heard
Rhame v. Ferguson,6 3 an action in trover to obtain possession of four-
teen slaves. The issue raised in the case was whether the slaves in
question had been emancipated contrary to the Act of 1820.
George Broad, the original owner of the slaves, drafted a will that
left certain slaves in trust to John Dangerfield. The will directed Dan-
gerfield to permit the slaves to apply their time and labor solely for
their own use without interference. The testator also willed the rest of
his estate to John Dangerfield, to be used and enjoyed by the slaves . 4
162. In addition to Judge O'Neall, the new law court of appeals consisted of Richard
Gantt, John S. Richardson, Balies J. Earle, Joseph J. Evans, and A. Pickens Butler.
Richardson was an active Unionist and considered by many to be one of the best Union-
ist theorists. See W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 168. He was the Unionist counterpart
of Judge William Harper, long regarded as one of the leading theorists among the Nulli-
ficationists. Id. Butler was a Nullificationist. The political persuasions of the others, with
the exception of Judge O'Neall, who was a Unionist, are not known to the author. Their
positions on slavery also are not known to the author.
163. 24 S.C.L. (Rice) 196 (1839).
164. The will provided in part:
I give and bequeath to my friend John R. Dangerfield ... my slaves Daphne
and her children ... and her grand children ... together with the future is-
sue and increase of such as are females: in trust, nevertheless, and for this
purpose only, that the said John R. Dangerfield, his executors and assigns, do
permit and suffer the slaves above mentioned, and each and every of them and
their future issue and increase, to apply and appropriate their time and labor
to their own proper use and behoof, without the intermeddling or interference
of any person or persons whomsoever, further than may be necessary for their
protection under the laws of this State, which now exist, or may be passed
hereafter; then I give and bequeath all the rest . . . of my estate ... to my
said friend John R. Dangerfield... upon trust, nevertheless, and for this pur-
pose only, that the said slaves above mentioned ... and their future issue and
increase, be permitted ... to use and enjoy the said estate ... forever, with-
out the interference or meddling of ... any person or persons whomsoever,
further than may be necessary to secure to the said slaves the full use and
enjoyment of the estate above mentioned.
Id. at 197 (emphasis in original).
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George Broad died in 1836 and Dangerfield, as executor, appar-
ently followed his wishes. The evidence revealed that the slaves had
lived peaceably by themselves on the testator's estate and that Danger-
field, who lived nearby, supervised their work, paid their taxes and
otherwise looked after them. The plaintiff, Mrs. Rhame, claimed the
Negroes had been illegally emancipated, and attempted to capture
them.
Judge Butler heard the case on circuit. He charged the jury that
Broad's will was an attempt to evade the laws that restricted emanci-
pation, and if in fact the slaves were enjoying the privileges of free
persons without being subject to the control of a white person, the
slaves were subject to seizure. 1e 5 Butler also informed the jury that
Dangerfield had legal title to the blacks.
The questions Butler put to the jury were: (1) whether the slaves
had been emancipated de facto and (2) if so, whether the attempted
seizure of the slaves was a valid capture under the laws of South Caro-
lina."'6 The jury found that the slaves had not been emancipated. On
appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the legislation that restricted emanci-
pation was intended to prevent slaves from enjoying the benefits of
freedom while nominally under the control of a white person. The
court, however, was not persuaded. It unanimously upheld the jury's
verdict.
67
Together, Linam v. Johnson, Cline v. CaIdwell, Frazier v. Fra-
zier's Executors, and Rhame v. Ferguson created important exceptions
to the Act of 1820. After Linam and Cline, quasi-emancipation could
be accomplished through a deed with a secret trust. The appointment
of a guardian or technical ownership by a free person, whether black or
white, prevented capture of the emancipated slave by third parties. Af-
ter Frazier, absolute emancipation could be accomplished through a
will that directed executors to take the slaves outside South Carolina
to free them. Additionally, slaves could inherit property, contrary to
law. Rhame permitted a trustee who held legal title to slaves to allow
them to enjoy the benefits of freedom and inherited property without
direct, on-site supervision by a white person.
The last case brought under the Act of 1820, Carmille v. Pringle'6"
was decided in February 1842, just a few months after the Act of 1841
became law. A combined court of the courts of appeal of both law and
equity decided the case.
John Carmille died in July 1833, leaving a will. The will left
165. Id. at 200-01.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 202-03.
168. 27 S.C.L. (2 McMul.) 454 (1842).
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Carmille's entire estate to his slave Henrietta and her children. The
will further directed the executor to emancipate the named slaves if
possible and, if not, to free them in a country in which emancipation
could be accomplished. Carmine married after signing the will. The
marriage produced a daughter, Julia Carmille. The daughter survived
Carmille. On this basis, the court refused to probate the will.169 Thus,
Carmille effectively died intestate.
However, in 1830 Carmine had deeded the slaves in question to
George Pringle and Phillip Chartrand for a nominal sum. The deeds
created a special trust that directed Pringle and Chartrand to permit
the slaves to work for their own maintenance and support and to retain
their earnings for their own use. Carmille retained possession of the
slaves until his death, at which time possession passed to Pringle and
Chartrand, who were also the administrators of Carmille's estate. After
Carmille's death, the daughter's representative sued on her behalf and
claimed that the slaves should be included in Carmille's estate. The
case went to trial in 1839, two years before the Act of 1841 was
passed.170 The lower court, ruling for the plaintiff, held that the deeds
that purported to sell Henrietta and her children were undisguised at-
tempts to evade the law that prohibited emancipation.1 7 1 Judge
O'Neall, writing for a unanimous court on appeal, overruled the lower
court. 7 2 He relied on Frazier v. Frazier's Executors and Linam v.
Johnson, and held that the Act of 1820 did not void emancipations
effected by means other than acts of the legislature, but rather sub-
jected illegally emancipated slaves to capture. Judge O'Neall cited Le-
noir v. Sylvester and Cline v. Caldwell, and found that slaves in the
legal possession of an owner were not subject to seizure. He character-
ized the requirement that the slaves pay the executors an annual sum
of one dollar as a "constant recognition of servitude.' ' 7 3 Judge O'Neall
relied on Cline and found further that persons who claimed under the
donor of an illegal deed could not set it aside. He found that the acqui-
sition of personal property by slaves was lawful because, with the ex-
ception of prohibitions enumerated in the Act of 1740, slaves had cus-
tomarily been permitted to acquire and hold property with the owner's
consent.
In the opinion, Judge O'Neall advocated amelioration of the slave
laws. He wrote:
169. Id.
170. It is unclear whether the Legislature had Carmille in mind when it drafted the
Act of 1841, but the terms of the Act seem to cover the situation presented by the facts
of the case.
171. Carmille, 27 S.C.L. (2 McMul.) at 456.
172. Id. at 472.
173. Id. at 468.
[Vol. 42
38
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/3
S.C. SLAVE LAW
Kindness to slaves, according to my judgment, is the true policy
of slave owners, and its spirit should go (as it generally has) into the
making of the law, and ought to be a ruling principle of its construc-
tion. Nothing will more assuredly defeat our institution of slavery,
than harsh legislation rigorously enforced.
17 4
Unlike earlier emancipation decisions of the court, Carmille v.
Pringle relies heavily on precedent to support its conclusions. This reli-
ance on precedent marks a change in judicial style from that found in
,earlier slavery decisions, particularly those of Judge O'Neall. Earlier
opinions had been based on considerations of equity and policy rather
than precedent. 175 The change in judicial style became important in
later cases, however, because the precedential force of earlier emanci-
pation cases bound later, and often unwilling, courts .1 6 In Broughton
v. Telfer, 7 for example, Chancellor Dargan wrote:
I have never been satisfied with the decision in Carmille v. Carmille
[Carmille v. Pringle]. I cannot pass it without expressing my dissent
and disapprobation. It is founded upon what I conceive to be a very
erroneous construction of the Act of 1820. That Act declares that
there shall be no emancipation but by the Legislature. But the deci-
sion in Carmille v. Carmille declares that the emancipator has only to
be secure of his trustee to effect the emancipation of his slaves, whom
he desires to manumit, in as perfect a manner as if the Act of 1820
was not on the Statute Book.
17 8
Broughton was not unique, and the force and effect of the decisions
that predated the Act of 1841 continued for several years.
3. The Act of 1841
In 1841 the South Carolina Legislature passed a statute that pro-
hibited indirect, as well as direct, attempts to emancipate slaves. 79
174. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original).
175. See, e.g., Frazier v. Frazier's Ex'rs, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 304 (1835).
176. See, e.g., Morton v. Thompson, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 370 (1854); Broughton
v. Telfer, 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich Eq.) 431 (1851); McLeish v. Burch, 22 S.C. Eq. (3 Strob.
Eq.) 225 (1849); see also Gordon v. Blackman, 18 S.C. Eq. (1 Rich. Eq.) 61 (1844) (trial
court opinion reserves a discussion of the "sweeping" decision in Carmille to the appel-
late court).
177. 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich. Eq.) 431 (1851).
178. Id. at 435-36.
179. See Act of 1841, 1841 S.C. Acts 168-69. The Act provided:
I.. . . That any bequest, deed of trust, or conveyance, intended
to take effect after the death of the owner, whereby the removal of
any slave or slaves without the limits of this State, is secured or in-
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The statute clearly was drafted with Linam v. Johnson, Frazier v. Fra-
zier's Executors, Cline v. Caldwell, Rhame v. Ferguson, and, perhaps
Carmille v. Pringle, in mind. 80
The Act of 1841 eventually took its toll on attempted emancipa-
tions, several of which were struck down.'"" Nevertheless, at least two
methods of emancipation-one by deed, the other by will-survived
the scythe of the legislative reaper. In Vose v. Hannahan,'8' Judge
O'Neall, writing for a unanimous court that included both the judges
at law and at equity, upheld a deed that included a secret trust requir-
ing the transferee to hold the slaves in nominal servitude only. Al-
though the language of the Act of 1841 declared such deeds void, 8 the
court held that the deed would be good against both the transferor and
the administrator of his estate.' 8' This holding was consistent with the
court's earlier holdings in which the court enforced illegal emancipa-
tions against the claims of the owner.
Two years after Vose, the South Carolina Legislature once again
reorganized the courts.' 0 The legislature reinstated a three judge court
of appeals for both law and equity, a return to the court structure in
effect when Judges Johnson, Harper, and O'Neall had served on the
tended, with a view to the emancipation of such slave or slaves, shall
be utterly void and of no effect.
II. That any gift of any slave or slaves, hereafter made, by deed or
otherwise, accompanied by a trust, secret or expressed, that the donee
shall remove such slave or slaves from the limits of this State, with
the purpose of emancipation, shall be void and of no effect.
III. That any bequest, gift, or conveyance, of any slave or slaves,
accompanied with a trust or confidence, either secret or expressed,
that such slave or slaves shall be held in nominal servitude only, shall
be void and of no effect.
IV. That every devise or bequest, to a slave or slaves, or to any
person, upon a trust or confidence, secret or expressed, for the benefit
of any slave or slaves, shall be null and void.
Id.
180. See Morton v. Thompson, 27 S.C. Eq. (6 Rich. Eq.) 370, 375-76 (1854).
181. See, e.g., Lanham v Meacham, 23 S.C. Eq. (4 Strob. Eq.) 203 (1850); Finley v.
Hunter, 21 S.C. Eq. (2 Strob. Eq.) 208 (1848); Dougherty v. Dougherty, 21 S.C. Eq. (2
Strob. Eq.) 63 (1848); Blackman v. Gordon, 19 S.C. Eq. (2 Rich. Eq.) 43 (1845); see also
Mays v. Gillam, 31 S.C.L. (2 Rich.) 160 (1845) (an attempt to emancipate a slave con-
trary to law made the slave subject to seizure by third parties).
182. 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) 465 (1857).
183. See Act of 1841, § III, 1841 S.C. Acts 155.
184. Vose, 44 S.C.L. (10 Rich.) at 472-73.
185. An Act to Establish a Separate Court of Appeals, 1859 S.C. Acts 647 (1859).
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single court of appeals.""6 Judge O'Neall became the chief judge and
two chancellors of the former equity court of appeals served as his as-
sociate judges.
187
In 1860 the reorganized court gave effect to apparently illegal
emancipations in Willis v. Jolliffe. 81 The testator in Willis, Elijah Wil-
lis, had executed a will in 1854 that directed his executors to take his
slave Amy and her children to Ohio and to free them there. The will,
furthermore, left his estate in trust for the slaves. Not content with
these provisions, however, Willis left South Carolina and moved to
Cincinnati accompanied by Amy, her mother, and her children. Unfor-
tunately, Willis died immediately after arriving in Ohio. Mr. Willis's
next of kin, the plaintiffs in the case, challenged the provisions of the
will that concerned the slaves as void under the Act of 1841.189
Judge O'Neall, writing for the court, upheld the emancipation of
the slaves. 1 0 In his opinion, he characterized the central issue of the
case not as whether the emancipation was permissible under the Act of
1841, but whether the slaves' arrival in Ohio had emancipated them.
O'Neall based his decision to emancipate on the Ohio Constitution,
which prohibited slavery within the state's borders. 191 He concluded
that the protections of the Ohio Constitution extended to Willis's
slaves because Willis had taken them there to emancipate then, and
because the slaves had not been in Ohio as transients. Willis and the
slaves both intended that Ohio would become the slaves' domicile.
Thus, Willis's assent to emancipation while the slaves were on free soil
effected the emancipation.
1 2
Willis was the last in a series of slavery cases that spanned a forty-
year period of South Carolina jurisprudence. During the 1820s and
1830s South Carolina was beset with economic and political troubles
that resulted in dissension and turmoil. The state's economy was
nearly bankrupt; banks failed and short-staple cotton prices plunged.
186. See text accompanying notes 160-62.
187. One of the associate judges was Job Johnston, a former law partner of Judge
O'Neall's in Newberry, South Carolina and, like O'Neall, a graduate of South Carolina
College (later, the University of South Carolina). The third member of the bench was F.
H. Wardlaw, a member of a family of distinguished jurists.
188. 32 S.C. Eq. (11 Rich. Eq.) 447 (1860).
189. Id. at 448-51.
190. Id. at 517.
191. Id. at 513.
192. Id. at 513-14. Judge Johnson concurred in the result without writing an opin-
ion. Id. at 517. Judge Wardlaw dissented and questioned whether the slaves would be
free even if only Ohio law were applied. Ohio law required free blacks to produce proof
of their freedom and post bond before entering the state. Wardlaw doubted that Amy
and her family could become free by entering the state unlawfully. Id. at 524-25. For a
similar result, see Guillmette v. Harper, 38 S.C.L. (4 Rich.) 186 (1850).
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Fears of slave rebellion were rampant, fed by the Denmark Vesey re-
volt in 1822 and the Nat Turner insurrection nearly ten years later. As
abolitionist movements and colonization societies emerged, some of the
most radical voices, such as those of the Grimk6 sisters, sounded from
Charleston, the capital of the South Carolina low country.
The South Carolina Legislature responded to economic depression,
fear of insurrection, and abolitionist campaigns, and assumed an in-
creasingly militant states' rights stance. The legislature passed harsh
laws intended to preserve the institution of slavery. Throughout the
period between 1820 and 1845, however, South Carolina jurists actively
limited the effect of the increasingly strict emancipation laws. The fol-
lowing section suggests some possible explanations for the South Caro-
lina emancipation decisions.
V. WHY THE COURT DECIDED As IT DID
The prolonged assault by the South Carolina Court of Appeals on
the state statutes that restricted emancipation seems extraordinary, es-
pecially in light of the social and political context of much of the ante-
bellum period. Nevertheless, it is clear that for a period of almost
twenty years, the judges of South Carolina's highest court felt free to
act on their policy views that were contrary to those of the legislature.
It is extraordinary that such a purposeful assault could continue for so
many years without threatening social disorder, or at least leading to
the impeachment of some members of the bench. Yet, the social fabric
of South Carolina remained intact. Although some of the judicial opin-
ions were controversial, no apparent evidence exists that they caused
any serious disruptions of life in the Palmetto State. The state legisla-
ture, which appointed the judges, had at least two opportunities to re-
move or demote unwanted jurists from the bench. The legislature,
however, took neither course193
At least five important circumstances of South Carolina social and
political life help to explain the emancipation decisions and their open
opposition to restrictive statutes. First, as the cases suggest, South
Carolinians held diverse views about slavery. Appellate courts included
both proslavery judges and advocates of reform. Even when members
of the court held differing views, however, the particular nature of the
emancipation issue offered opportunities for consensus on differing ba-
ses. Second, these judicial opinions reflected South Carolina's increas-
ing recognition of the moral ambiguity of the proslavery position, espe-
cially in a country based on democratic ideals. The emancipation issue
compelled the judges to confront directly the question of whether one
193. See supra notes 160-62, 185-87 and accompanying text.
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person could enslave another against his will. Third, the jurisprudence
of the period enabled the judges to accomplish their goals by using
accepted principles of judicial decision making. Doctrines such as eq-
uity of the statute proved to be useful interpretive tools. Fourth, re-
form of the institution of slavery was often accomplished through
changes in customary rather than statutory law. Thus, in keeping with
common-law traditions, judicial decisions apparently were influenced
by the customs and practices of the people rather than by legislative
enactments. Finally, during the antebellum period South Carolina was
governed primarily by a small group bound together by close social,
educational, and family ties. The closed membership of government
may have made dissent within the group permissible, although such
dissent would have been intolerable had it been voiced by the general
public.
A. South Carolina Views on Slavery and the Opportunity for
Consensus
It is important to recall that no single judge's efforts produced the
emancipation decisions. Panels of judges, numbering from three to
eight, decided the cases. Furthermore, there were relatively few dis-
senting opinions. Most of the decisions were unanimous even when the
panels included both known proslavery apologists, like William
Harper, and advocates of reform like John Belton O'Neall.
In light of the individual judges' diverse views on slavery, an ex-
amination of the circumstances that permitted these decisions should
begin with a consideration of the range and complexity of nineteenth-
century Southern attitudes toward slavery and emancipation. The
South Carolina economy was built on the backs of laboring black
slaves. Many people feared that South Carolina's undiversified econ-
omy would collapse without slave labor. In addition, many South
Carolinians' derived their wealth as much from holdings in slave prop-
erty, as from real estate. Despite the social and economic threats posed
by eliminating slavery, however, many Southerners were keenly aware
of the injustices of the system and of the sharp-edged irony of the
presence and defense of slavery in a country founded upon democratic
ideals.19
4
The problems associated with emancipation, however, were signifi-
cantly greater for Southerners than for Northerners. Although
Northerners like Southerners, rejected the idea of a racially integrated
society,195 the situation in the South was complicated because blacks
194. See infra notes 202-03, 217-18 and accompanying text.
195. Ideas of white superiority and conceptions of the black race as a degraded caste
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often outnumbered whites by as much as four to one. The ratio was
even greater in South Carolina's tidewater areas, the location of many
large plantations worked by hundreds of slaves.
In contrast, the Northern economy was substantially more diversi-
fied than that of the South. Additionally, Northern slave holders had
opportunities for financial rescue that were unavailable in the South.
Many sold their slaves to Southerners before Northern emancipation
laws became effective.1 6 Thus, with a single act, they avoided both the
economic loss and racial integration that would inevitably result from
emancipation of Southern slaves.
Despite the apparently overwhelming obstacles to ending South-
ern slavery, the results of the South Carolina emancipation decisions
clearly seem to be the product of a court that was reform-minded on
the issue of emancipation. One reason for this may be that the cases
reflect views that were more widely held than is commonly assumed. A
second explanation is derived from the emancipation issue itself. It
presented opportunities for consensus among those who held widely-
divergent views about slavery.
Attitudes toward slavery sometimes are characterized by reference
to two models. The first model can be illustrated by abolitionists like
the Grimk6 sisters, two members of a prominent Charleston family
who, in the late 1830s, called for immediate emancipation to eradicate
an absolute evil. The sisters freed their family slaves, wrote abolitionist
tracts, and actively worked for many years in the name of emancipa-
tion.197 The second model can be illustrated by the defenders of slavery
like South Carolina jurist William Harper"98 who wrote an elaborate
defense of slavery during the 1830s. That work is considered to be one
were not confined to Southern society. Northern states like Illinois, which prohibited
slavery, discouraged an interracial society by conditioning the entry of free blacks into
the state upon the posting of a $1,000 bond. Once admitted to the state, however, free
black persons still had a sorry lot. The provisions of the Illinois code that regulated
servants had a striking resemblance to the Southern slave codes, including equating ser-
vant status with being a member of the Negro race. See ILL. REV. STAT. §§ 1, 2, 5, 9, 10-22
(1845), reprinted in J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND ExPRESSION 471-74 (1973). Even President Lincoln doubted the desirabil-
ity of a racially-mixed society. He favored the recolonization of blacks to Africa and
succeeded in persuading Congress to appropriate money for the venture. Address on Col-
onization to a Deputation of Colored Men (August 14, 1862), reprinted in id. 462-63.
Furthermore, members of the American Colonization Society, whose membership was
drawn from both the North and the South, were often defenders of slavery. W. WIECEK,
THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 126-27
(1977).
196. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3, at 322.
197. See 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY pt. 1, at 634-35 (1964 ed.).
198. See 1 U. BROOKS, SOUTH CAROLINA BENCH AND BAR 90, 93 (1908); 1 J. O'NEALL,
supra note 93, at 270-74.
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of the most important proslavery tracts of the antebellum period.199
Proponents of slavery believed that slavery was essential to the contin-
ued control of a class of people that should not be permitted to live as
free persons. They often cited The Bible as authority for the proposi-
tion that the continued enslavement of blacks was a necessity.20 0 On a
pragmatic level, they argued that without slavery no one could be in-
duced to work on the plantations, particularly in the swampy, malaria-
ridden fields of the lowland plantations.
Although a slavery apologist, William Harper openly advocated
improvement of the slaves' standard of living. His concern, however,
for the slaves' well-being seemed to be as much a product of a desire to
perpetuate the institution as it was a regard for humanitarian princi-
ples. Harper wrote:
It is wise, too, in relation to the civilized world around us, to
avoid giving occasion to the odium which is so industriously excited
against ourselves and our institutions. For this reason, public opinion
should, if possible, bear even more strongly and indignantly than it
does at present, on masters who practice any wanton cruelty on their
slaves. The miscreant who is guilty of this not only violates the law of
God and of humanity, but . . .by bringing odium upon, endangers
the institutions of his country, and the safety of his countrymen. 01
Between these opposite views was a continuum of Southern per-
spectives that reflected a tension between aversion to the slave institu-
tion and fear that sudden emancipation would produce only economic
ruin and racial warfare. For example, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker
proposed a plan that called for the gradual emancipation of the slaves.
He was only too aware that slavery was inconsistent with the principles
of liberty that formed the foundation of our government. He, like
Thomas Jefferson, believed that slavery poisoned the morals of the
masters and destroyed their industry as well.202 To him slavery was
"the bitterest draught that ever flowed from the cup of affliction.
20 3
Yet, for Tucker, immediate emancipation was not the answer.
20 4
Tucker proposed the emancipation of all female slaves and their de-
scendants after a certain date. As compensation for the cost of their
199. 4 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY pt. 2, at 287 (1964 ed.).
200. W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 80, 328.
201. E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 55 (1974)
(quoting from Harper's writings on slavery).
202. See 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 19, at 69.
203. Id. app., at 31.
204. Tucker wrote that "[t]he early impression of obedience and submission, which
slaves have received among us, and the no less habitual arrogance and assumption of
superiority, among the whites, contribute, equally, to unfit the former for freedom, and
the latter for equality." Id. app., at 69 (emphasis in original).
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care, the emancipated slaves would be required to continue to serve
their former owners until they reached the age of twenty-eight. Their
children, although free, would be bound in service to the overseers of
the poor until they reached the age of twenty-one years. 0 5
Although Tucker advocated the abolition of slavery he did not ac-
cept the idea of an interracial society. Under his plan the freed blacks
would not be granted civil rights because he did not want to encourage
them to stay in the United States. He believed that denying blacks
their civil rights would make it in their best interests to live else-
where. 206 Thus, Tucker was a Southerner who advocated gradual eman-
cipation of blacks combined with incentives for them to leave the
United States.
Byron Edwards was a Jamaican who was considered to be a pre-
eminent statesman and intellectual of the slaveholding society. Al-
though Edwards was a member of the plantation culture, he was no
friend of slavery as it then existed. He actively worked for reform of
the institution. His views were well known and his writings widely
read.
Edwards proposed that slaves should be bound to the land. Slaves
then could be sold only as part of an estate, and not as individuals.
Edwards also helped to repeal laws that permitted creditors to sell
slaves to satisfy their owner's debts. Edwards further proposed that
slaves be paid for extra labor, that they be permitted to own property
in their own right, and that they be permitted to have their own juries
to judge one another. Although Edwards opposed the idea of racial
equality, he accepted the reality of an interracial society. He feared,
however, as did many of his contemporaries, that sudden emancipation
would cause a race war and economic ruin.
20 7
John Hartwell Cocke, a prominent Virginia planter, is also worthy
of discussion. Cocke, like Tucker, believed that slavery was profoundly
wrong. Yet, like Tucker, Cocke was not prepared for an interracial so-
ciety in which blacks would overwhelmingly outnumber whites. Never-
theless, he devised a plan for the gradual emancipation of his slaves.
He purchased a plantation that he dedicated to the purpose of prepar-
ing slaves for their freedom. Slaves living on the new plantation
learned to read, write, and keep accounts, and they were trained in the
agricultural, trade, and husbandry skills necessary to become economi-
cally self-sustaining. After a predetermined period had elapsed, Cocke
freed those slaves who had completed their apprenticeship satisfacto-
205. Id. at 77-78.
206. See id. at 79.
207. D. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 189-95.
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rily and arranged for their passage to Liberia. 08
The Grimk6 sisters, William Harper, St. George Tucker, Byron
Edwards, and John Cocke represent the spectrum of differing attitudes
toward slavery present in slave holding societies. Because of the range
and complexity of Southern attitudes toward slavery it is often difficult
to append contemporary labels, such as libertarian or reactionary, to
views held during the antebellum period. An examination of Judge
O'Neall's views on slavery reveal the difficulty of labeling antebellum
attitudes with contemporary terms.
Judge O'Neall's attitudes toward slavery were somewhere between
those of St. George Tucker and those of Byron Edwards. His views
were probably closer to Edwards', although Genovese has suggested
that his views were more reform-minded than he generally ex-
pressed.20 9 Throughout his judicial career Judge O'Neall called for
slave reform.
In 1848 Judge O'Neall wrote a digest entitled The Negro Law of
South Carolina.210 The digest purported to be a compendium of South
Carolina slave law. The digest became an instrument of slave law re-
form, a fact not lost on Judge O'Neall's contemporaries. One newspa-
per's account of the digest claimed that Judge O'Neall was attempting
to put blacks on an equal footing with whites. 2 1' After completing the
digest Judge O'Neall read it to the South Carolina Agricultural Soci-
ety, an organization comprised of the state's plantation owners and
farmers. The members of the Society apparently supported his views
on the need for slave reform because they recommended that Judge
O'Neall submit the work to the Governor for consideration by the
legislature.
212
In his digest Judge O'Neall advocated making it easier for mulat-
toes to be classified as whites, permitting miscegenation, limiting mas-
ters' punishment of their slaves, and improving slaves' working and liv-
ing conditions and treatment by their owners. Owners that did not
comply would be subject to stiff penalties. He endorsed Edwards' ear-
lier proposal that slaves should be sold only with the land to avoid
208. See generally DEAR MASTER: LETTERS OF A SLAVE FAMILY 35-36 (R. Miller ed.
1978).
209. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 52.
210. J. O'NEALL, THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1848).
211. See Nash, Negro Rights, Unionism, and Greatness on the South Carolina
Court of Appeals, 21 S.C.L. REv. 141, 186 (1969) (quoting an editorial from the
Telegraph).
212. At the Governor's direction, the Senate Judiciary Committee reviewed the
work. The members described it as being a useful compilation of the law, but recom-
mended that the state not publish the work since it contained opinions opposed to what
was characterized as settled state policy.
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breaking up families and to prevent slaves from having a succession of
masters in a short period of time. He advocated the repeal of the Ne-
gro Seaman's Acts, as well as laws that restricted emancipation and
laws that forbade teaching slaves to read or write. He also attempted
to extend to slaves many of the guarantees of personal security that
the common law extended to whites.
213
It seems likely, then, that one explanation for the emancipation
decisions is that advocates of reform existed throughout South Caro-
lina's slaveholding society, and that their views were more widely ac-
cepted than has been assumed. First, the South Carolina cases them-
selves support this conclusion. Most of the decisions discussed in this
Article were decided initially by a jury of property-owning men, and in
almost every case the jury voted for emancipation. The court of ap-
peals decisions generally were consistent with the jury decisions. Sec-
ond, the Agricultural Society approved Judge O'Neall's proposals for
reform and recommended them to the state legislature, which clearly
indicates that his slaveholding counterparts were not entirely opposed
to his ideas.
One is nonetheless compelled to ask why judges like William
Harper, who were not reform-minded, voted with Judge O'Neall on the
emancipation cases. Part of the answer may lie in the nature of the
emancipation issue itself. It presented opportunities for consensus
among those who held widely diverse views about slavery.
As late as 1845, Judge O'Neall argued that public opinion both in
South Carolina and in other states opposed the statutes that restricted
emancipation. 214 Antislavery reformers naturally opposed these stat-
utes. Proponents of slavery might also have opposed these laws be-
cause they encroached upon the owner's authority to free his slaves, an
authority that had been virtually unchecked from 1740 to 1800.
The power to emancipate was an essential power of the master
class, enabling the master to "dispense the only reward, which either
he, or his slave appreciates. '215 In addition, many Southerners believed
that harsh laws would bring more attacks on slavery, rather than make
it more secure. As Judge Harper wrote, slave owners believed it to be a
misfortune that they were "compelled to subject to a jealous police,
and to view with distrust and severity, . . [slaves] we are disposed to
regard with confidence and kindness."2 ' It is probable, then, that a
213. See generally J. O'NEALL, supra note 210, at ch. I, §§ 8, 47, 65; ch. II, §§ 9, 17,
18, 20, 21, 25, 41, 64.
214. See generally Vinyard v. Passolargue, 32 S.C.L. (2 Strob.) 536, 547-48 (1846)
(O'NealI, J. dissenting); J. O'NEALL, supra note 210, at ch. I, § 37.
215. J. O'NEALL, supra note 210, at 12.
216. See W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 67.
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consensus could be formed of both opponents and proponents of slav-
ery that would produce the judicial decisions that restricted the laws
against emancipation. Acts of kindness and humanity toward individ-
ual slaves and protection of the owners' dominion over slaves contin-
ued to be permissible, even if dismantling the institution was not.
Furthermore, judges may have had greater opportunity to reach a
consensus based on reform than did legislators. The judges, represent-
ing diverse geographic and political interests of the state, had equal
votes. In contrast, as a result of restrictive practices and property re-
quirements for holding office, the antebellum South Carolina Legisla-
ture was controlled by the tidewater planters, those with the largest
plantations, with the least personal contact with their slaves, and, per-
haps also, with the greatest to fear in terms of both economic ruin and
threats to personal security should slavery be abolished.
B. Recognition of the Moral Ambiguity of the Proslavery Position
A second reason that the court decided the emancipation cases the
way it did is that South Carolina slaveholders increasingly recognized
the moral ambiguity of the proslavery position. When the emancipa-
tion issue was raised directly in the context of a dispute between the
owner and the slaves themselves, the dispute became one between indi-
viduals. When freedom was at stake it was impossible to deny the hu-
manity of the slave. Furthermore, when freedom was at stake, the
judges and juries were compelled to face the central moral question of
slavery: is it right for one human being to enslave another against his
will?
Southerners were acutely aware that slavery undercut the moral
fiber of a country founded on libertarian ideals. Henry Laurens of
South Carolina favored abolition of slavery.21 Judge William Gaston of
North Carolina publicly denounced slavery as an institution that "poi-
sons morals at the fountain head. '21s Allowing emancipation of individ-
ual slaves or small groups of them in specific cases permitted correct
moral decisions without threatening the entire structure of society. It
was no accident that the emancipation decisions, even when decided in
the law rather than the equity courts, were based on fundamental equi-
table principles, rather than on legal analysis of statutes. These deci-
sions did not merely erode legislative enactments; they seemed to be
the beginning of an internal attack on the institution of slavery itself.
217. Henry Laurens' views on slavery were described by his son, John Laurens, in a
letter to his father in October 1776. The letter is reprinted in 5 S.C. Hist. and Geneology
Mag. 205-06 (1904).
218. J. SCHAUINGER, WILLIAM GASTON, CAROLINIAN 166 (1949).
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Slaves began to be regarded as human beings with compelling equita-
ble claims, rather than as property.
For many Southerners the troubling issue was not abolition of the
despised institution, but the problem of suddenly creating an interra-
cial society that would be overwhelmingly black. Granting blacks civil
rights would transform society and threaten the security of the white
power structure. The emancipation cases considered solely whether the
individual slave or slaves before the court were entitled to freedom.
When confronted with the moral question of slavery on an individual
basis, the judges and juries were willing to do what was clearly right.
Freeing individual slaves did not pose a threat to the established social
structure.
The limitations of the judicial decision making process may also
have played a role in the emancipation decisions. The scope of influ-
ence of these judicial decisions was much more restricted than that of
the legislature's enactments. Courts, by the very nature of their deci-
sion-making process, change the law incrementally. In contrast, the
legislature makes broad statements of policy.219 Furthermore, the jury
system may permit the infusion of commonly held values into the legal
system at an earlier point than does the legislative process. It is not
surprising, therefore, that judges, rather than legislators, became the
spokespersons for rqform in antebellum South Carolina.
What seemed to be occurring in antebellum South Carolina has
been suggested by T. Nicolaus Tideman in another context. Tideman
proposed that "[w]hen through an evolution in our moral understand-
ing we begin to realize that a class of entitlements is unjustly held,
courts may begin to deny protection to those entitlements before we
reform their holding through legislation. '220 In antebellum South Caro-
lina, courts and juries defended the emancipation of slaves against
owners and heirs who wanted to reenslave them as well as against the
legislature that would deny the slaves freedom.
The possibilities for consensus between judges with differing views
about slavery and the opportunities for making correct moral decisions
may explain the results of the emancipation cases, but they do not ex-
plain why the judges felt free to express their views regarding restric-
tions on emancipation. The explanation lies in the characteristics of
antebellum judicial decision making.
219. For example, the state statutes that restricted emancipation may have been as
much a reaction to external pressures on the institution of slavery, as a careful consider-
ation of the state's policy of maintaining slavery. These laws may have been intended to
serve as a warning to outsiders as well as a mandate to South Carolina residents.
220. Tideman, Takings, Moral Evolution, and Justice, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1714
(1988).
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C. Characteristics of Judicial Decision Making in the Antebellum
Period
Despite the South Carolina courts' flagrant and persistent opposi-
tion to the will of the legislature, the emancipation decisions do not
suggest that the judges experienced any conflict between their role as
judicial enforcers of the law and their individual beliefs that the stat-
utes were wrong.221 To the contrary, the language of the opinions indi-
cates that the judges purposefully nullified the emancipation statutes,
pursuing their objective without any apparent tension between their
judicial role and their individual views. One reason they were able to
pursue such a course lies in the nature of the accepted jurisprudence of
the day.
During much of the antebellum period, the instrumental style of
judicial reasoning prevailed. Both questions of policy and of society's
needs were prevalent in judicial reasoning. Judges did not regard
themselves as will-less appliers of the law.222 Landis has stated that a
"chief point of departure between nineteenth- and twentieth-century
theories of the law lies in the emphasis placed upon the judge as a
creative artist in the making of law. '223 Judges' roles involved more
than deference to precedent and legislative edicts. Early in the antebel-
lum period, statutes and precedent, perhaps, were less controlling than
they later became when judicial analysis began to emphasize analysis
of legal rules, both common law and statutory. Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that in ex rel. Sally v. Beaty, Linam v. Johnson, Cline v. Caldwell,
Frazier v. Frazier's Executors, and Rhame v. Ferguson the courts
based their decisions on the equities of the case rather than on the
statutes.
As time passed, however, the concept of judges as passive appliers
of the law began to take hold. By the mid-nineteenth century, judges
began to defer to a greater extent to legislative enactments and to judi-
cial precedent. Beginning in the 1840s, South Carolina emancipation
decisions began to reflect the change. By that time, however, there
were enough decisions on the emancipation issue to establish legal pre-
cedent for the later courts, who felt bound to follow it. In Broughton v.
Telfer,224 for example, Chancellor Dargan felt compelled to follow
221. But cf. R. COVER, supra note 5, at 6-7, 226-38 (discussing the conflict between
judges' moral dilemma and restraints on the judiciary).
222. See L. FREIDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 100 (1973) (describing judges as
becoming more active and creative in interpreting the law).
223. J. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213
(1934).
224. Broughton v. Telfer, 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich. Eq.) 431 (1851).
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Carmille v. Pringle2 25 even though he believed it was "a very erroneous
construction of the Act of 1820.22
6
Antebellum judicial approaches to the interpretation of statutes
also differed, in some respects, from today's approaches. Landis has
described a doctrine called the equity of the statute that was used dur-
ing the nineteenth century. According to Landis, the doctrine contrib-
uted to the "concept of the statute as a nursing mother of the law.
'227
Statutes were used as a starting point for a judge's reasoning, but were
not necessarily dispositive of the case. Equitable considerations
predominated. Exceptions for particular circumstances, therefore, were
judicially drafted into statutes which appeared on their face to be dis-
positive and statutes were applied to situations that seemed to lie
outside of the statute's express terms.2
Landis' description of the doctrine is consistent with the reasoning
found in the emancipation decisions. For example, Frazier v. Frazier's
Executors, Rhame v. Ferguson, and Cline v. Caldwell were clearly
based on the equities of the particular case and not on the clear lan-
guage of the Act of 1820, which forbade emancipation except by act of
the legislature. Thus, both the style of reasoning and the doctrine of
the equity of the statute allowed judges to restrict legislative
enactments.
D. The Importance of Customary Rather Than Statutory Slave
Law
The attack on the statutes that restricted emancipation was also
influenced by the presence of two competing systems for regulating
slavery: a statutory system, which gave expression to slavery in its
harshest form, and a customary law, or in-dwelling law as Daniel Boor-
stin has characterized it,2 29 which gave expression to the more humane
aspects of the institution. Alexis de Toqueville discussed the diver-
gence between legal and customary treatment of black persons,
whether free or slave. When comparing the treatment of blacks in the
North with that of blacks in the South he observed that "legislation [in
the South] is more harsh against [blacks], but customs are more toler-
225. 27 S.C.L. (2 McMul.) 454 (1842). Carmille v. Pringle is referred to in the
Broughton decision as Carmille v. Carmille.
226. Broughton, 24 S.C. Eq. (3 Rich. Eq.) at 435.
227. J. LANDIS, supra note 223, at 214.
228. See id. at 215. For an illuminating discussion of the role of the contemporary
common-law judge who must contend with what Grant Gilmore described as an "orgy of
statute making," see G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1, 163-66
(1982).
229. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
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ant and gentle.
230
The Act of 1740 was the cornerstone of South Carolina's statutory
slave law until the Civil War. Like its predecessors, it reflected the con-
cerns of the low country planter class. The preamble and many of the
Act's general provisions were more temperate than one would expect
given that the statute was enacted in the immediate aftermath of a
slave insurrection. The strident language of the Acts of 1712 and 1722
that denounced the barbarism of the enslaved people was absent. In-
stead, the language of the new Act suggested a confident recognition
that absolute slavery had been firmly established in South Carolina.
The purposes of the slave law were to: (1) define the master's powers
over his slaves so that he could keep them subjugated; (2) limit the
master's authority in order to protect the slaves from excessive cruelty;
and (3) preserve public peace and order.2 ' Coercive necessity was the
fundamental principle of the Act of 1740.
32
The Act of 1740 created a slave system that differed in three im-
portant respects from the system created by the earlier South Carolina
codes. First, it did not rely solely on force and repression to control
slaves. It attempted to control by requiring better treatment of slaves
so that they would become accepting of their lot and depend more on
their owners.233 Second, despite characterizing slaves as chattels, the
230. A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 3, at 316.
231. Act of 1740, 1740 S.C. Acts 397. To distinguish the purposes of the Act of 1740
from that of prior acts compare the preamble of the Act of 1740 with the preambles of
the Act of 1712, 1712 S.C. Acts 352, and the Act of 1722, 1722 S.C. Acts 371.
232. See Kinloch v. Harvey, 16 S.C.L. (Harp.) 508, 514 (1830).
233. The killing of a slave, including a killing by the slave's owner, became an in-
dictable offense. If a slave was harmed and no evidence existed about the identity of the
perpetrator, the Act established a presumption that the owner was responsible for the
injury. Maiming a slave in the heat of passion and unlawfully beating a slave were also
indictable offenses. Act of 1740, §§ VI, XXXVII, XXXIX, 1740 S.C. Acts 397, 399, 410-
12. Owners who murdered their slaves were subject to a substantial fine (Z700) and sen-
tenced to seven years of hard labor if unable to pay the fine. They also were forbidden to
hold civil or military office in South Carolina. Id. § XXXVII, 1740 S.C. Acts 410-11.
The punishment of slaves for private offenses against the master was limited to
whipping. Public offenses were punished by whipping or, in the case of a capital offense,
death. For both public and private offenses, the Act forbade the imposition of penalties
such as branding, dismemberment, and castration of slaves. See id. However, slaves were
not granted a right of action on their own behalf. Proceedings against the owner could be
initiated either by public officials or concerned citizens. Incidents were prosecuted with
some success. These changes in the law are significant. They mark a change from the
stereotype of slaves as mere brutes and the beginning of a recognition of their humanity.
For example, slaves could not be required to work more than 15 hours a day between
March and September, the busy season, or more than 14 hours a day during the remain-
ing months. See id. § XLIV, 1740 S.C. Acts 413. While these hours seem oppressive when
measured by contemporary standards, Genovese has concluded that the hours the slaves
worked were about average for the time. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 61. The
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Act of 1740 expressly recognized the humanity of slaves. The Act, for
the first time, gave slaves the right to a trial by jury.23 4 Finally, the Act
limited an owner's power over his slave. His dominion was no longer
absolute. For the first time the law attempted to regulate the master-
slave relationship in order to protect slaves from excessive cruelty.
The Act also prohibited slaves from raising animals for their own
dse, keeping canoes, engaging in barter on their own behalf, trafficking
in any commodities, or renting real property of any kind. 35 The com-
bined effects of these restrictive provisions and other provisions that
required owners to provide food and clothing made the slaves com-
pletely dependent on their owners for every aspect of their subsistence.
Control of slaves would be based, in part, on the slaves' dependence on
their owners rather than solely on physical coercion.
The South Carolina legislature passed relatively few slave laws be-
tween 1740 and 1861. The laws that were passed made only minor revi-
sions to the Act of 1740, which had become a permanent part of South
Carolina's antebellum jurisprudence. Despite the few changes in statu-
tory slave law, however, the institution of slavery underwent substan-
tial change during this period. The changes occurred through develop-
ing the unwritten rules of customary law that governed the inhabitants
of South Carolina.
During the late eighteenth century and the start of the nineteenth
century, South Carolina developed three forms of slavery. The first de-
veloped in the lowland area of the state, where rice cultivation flour-
ished in the coastal swamps.2 36 The rich swampland was also well
suited to the cultivation of long-staple cotton. The low country rice
and long-staple cotton culture supported a style of living that typifies
Southern antebellum plantation life. Low country planters were re-
garded as the aristocrats of South Carolina society. They lived in luxu-
rious homes surrounded by immense plantations. Cultured minds, ele-
gant styles of living, and gracious manners were held in high regard. As
time passed, Charleston became the hub of South Carolina's tideland
plantation life.
Large gangs of black slaves worked the coastal plantations super-
vised by white overseers. The ratio of blacks to whites varied between
three to one and eight to one, depending on the county and the sea-
Act also required owners to provide slaves with sufficient food, clothing, and shelter. Act
of 1740, §§ XX, XXXVII, 1740 S.C. Acts 403, 411.
234. Id. §§ IX-XII, 1740 S.C. Acts 400-01. The Act's justification for the provision
was that "[n]atural justice forbids that any person, of what condition soever, should be
condemned unheard ..... Id. § IX, 1740 S.C. Acts 400. Jury trials had previously been
extended only to free white persons under the common law.
235. Id. §§ XXX, XXXI, XXXIV, XLII, 1740 S.C. Acts 407-10, 412-13.
236. G. ROGERS, JR., supra note 17, at 47.
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son.237 During the summer the whites moved away from Charleston
(some went as far as Newport, Rhode Island) to escape malaria and the
other infestations of the disease-ridden swamps. In the lowland area
whites' personal knowledge of individual slaves was restricted to slaves
who were house servants or skilled laborers. Many large plantation
owners knew little about the individual field hands. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that lowland planters considered personal security extremely
important.
The second form developed when the invention of the cotton gin
in 1793 assured the profitability of short-staple cotton. Many South
Carolinians left the tideland areas to become short-staple cotton plant-
ers in the South Carolina upcountry. The upcountry, however, never
became an inland copy of the coastal region. Upcountry plantations
were considerably smaller than their low country counterparts, and the
cotton planters there owned -fewer slaves. Plantation life did not domi-
nate the upcountry as it did the coastal areas, and in the interior re-
gions, blacks outnumbered whites only one and a half to one.23s The
opportunity for personal contact between blacks and whites was much
greater in the upcountry than in the tidal areas. Because of the numer-
ical balance, there may have been less fear of a race war in the inland
areas.
The third form of slavery could be found in the commercial cen-
ters of the state, where slaves provided both the skilled and unskilled
labor needed for the commercial economy. Slaves often were permitted
to hire out their time, as well as to live in the community at large,
thereby living in a state of quasi-emancipation.
Although the forms of slavery and attitudes toward the institution
were diverse, the statutory regulation of the institution remained con-
stant. The slave laws reflected the interests of the coastal slave owners.
The other forms of slavery developed outside the law. Thus, the diver-
gence between the practice of slavery and the actual slave statutes wid-
ened as the nineteenth century progressed.
Early in the eighteenth century, the South Carolina slave institu-
tion had earned a reputation for its "callous disregard for human
life."'239 By the nineteenth century much had changed. Economic, polit-
ical, and social forces had combined to create an environment condu-
cive to improving the treatment of slaves. Bondsmen came to be
237. See W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 7-11; see also Phillips, supra note 15, at
426-27 (giving population statistics for South Carolina lowland districts from 1790-1860).
238. W. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 18.
239. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 54 (quoting F. McDONALD, E. PLURIBUS
UNum: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1790, at 65 (1965)); see also W.
ROSE, supra note 10, at 161.
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viewed not as barbarians to be dealt with ruthlessly, but as members of
a large plantation family captured in a state of perpetual childhood.2 ,0
Although the progressive view of slavery did not refashion bond-
age into a system of beneficence, it did lead to improvement of the
harshest aspects of the system. Yet, with few exceptions, these modifi-
cations were not recorded in statutes, but instead were found in the
customs and informal rules of South Carolina society at large. Conse-
quently, a tension developed between the harsh restrictiveness of the
statutes and the liberalizing tendencies of the customary law.
According to Daniel Boorstin, in the South the "[g]reat planters
actually ran their affairs by informal understandings, gentlemen's
agreements and pledges of honor. '24 1 Legal papers rarely were used to
conduct the business of the Southern plantation. Nor were they used
much in Southern commerce during the early years of the nineteenth
century. The Southern way of life revealed itself in courtliness, gal-
lantry, and honor, not unlike the world created by Sir Walter Scott,
whose works were read widely in the South. Southerners took pride in
the relative meagerness of written slave law, perceiving this paucity as
a virtue of the slave institution. 242 Thus, it was custom, not legal rules,
that defined the slave institution. This perception of slavery did not
develop spontaneously. Rather, it developed over time, as the planta-
tion system prospered, as generations of American-born slaves left be-
hind African customs and languages, and as the colonies moved toward
and achieved independence from England.
As time passed, the concept of familial dependency became the
dominant principle of a slave institution founded on customary law.
The plantation owner's "family" came to include both black slaves and
white freemen. The plantation unit, in fact, was perceived as a three
family system consisting of the owner's immediate family, the slave
family, and the larger plantation family. 4 3 Judge John Belton O'Neall
gave voice to this perspective when he stated:
The slave ought to be fully aware that his master is to him what the
best administered government is to the good citizen, a perfect security
240. IV. RosE, supra note 10, at 83.
241. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 199 (1965).
242. According to Boorstin, in many Southerners' minds:
[T]he essence of slavery ... was that it did not depend on explicit instrumen-
tel rules; and this was precisely its virtue. For, under slavery, . . . the laws of
employment became one with the natural currents of social sentiment on both
sides: kindness and generosity on the side of the employer, loyalty and indus-
try on the side of the employed.
D. Boorstin, The Perils of Indwelling Law in THE RULE OF LAW 84-85 (R. Wolff ed.
1971).
243. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 73-75; W. RosE, supra note 10, at 31.
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from injury. When this is the case, the relation of master and servant
becomes little short of that of parent and child-it commences in the
weakness of the one and the strength of the other.
2 44
Judge O'Neal's comments reflect a paternalistic view of slavery; a
view different from that expressed in statutory law. Both views pre-
sumed the inferiority of the slaves. Statutory law presumed that race
relations were based on suspicion, mistrust, and fear.24 5 The primary
objective of the Act of 1740, as stated in its preamble, was to keep
slaves "in due subjugation and obedience and to make slavery abso-
lute."'24 6 The view of slavery and race relations described by Judge
O'Neall was very different from the view expressed in the Act of 1740.
The paternalistic view of slavery perceived slaves as inferior because
they were childlike, dependent, and because they needed protection,
not because they were considered threatening.2 47 Attitudes toward slav-
ery cannot be so easily defined. Nevertheless, the paternalistic view
presented opportunities for improvement and reform not found in the
harsher view of slavery expressed in statutory law.
Although much of the customary law of slavery remained unwrit-
ten, its prominence was shown through repeated incidents of willful
disregard of the statutory law. The extent to which the oppressive pro-
visions of the Act of 1740 were enforced has been the subject of de-
bate.2 48 For example, the Act expressly forbade teaching slaves to
write. Anyone caught teaching a slave to write was to be fined 100
pounds. 49 Only three years after the Act was passed, however, the So-
ciety for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Ports opened the
Charleston Negro School for black children, both slave and free. Many
244. Tennent v. Dendy, 23 S.C.L. (Dud.) 83, 86-87 (1837).
245. The characteristics of the two views of race relations are drawn from E. MoR-
GAN, supra note 9, at 325, and P. VAN DEN BERGHE, RACE & RACISM: A COMPARATIVE PER-
SPECTIVE 31-33 (1967).
246. Act of 1740, 1740 S.C. Acts 397 (1840). Slavery was declared to be absolute.
Slaves were forbidden to own real or personal property of any kind, to leave their
owner's premises without permission, to assemble with other slaves without a white per-
son being present, to learn to read or write, to engage in trade or barter, to carry firearms
(except in the presence of a white person), or to bring legal actions on their own behalf,
including suits for freedom. See generally id. §§ I, III, V, VII, XXIII, XXX, XXXI,
XXXIII, XXXIV, XLII, XLIII, XLV, 1740 S.C. Acts 397-413.
Thus, from the mid-eighteenth century on, South Carolina had established a form of
slavery which evoked the following response from de Toqueville almost a century later:
"The Negro has reached the ultimate limits of slavery. . . .The Negro has lost even the
ownership of his own body and cannot dispose of his own person without committing a
sort of larceny." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 3, at 293.
247. E. MORGAN, supra note 9, at 325; P. VAN DEN BERGHE, supra note 245, at 31-33.
248. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 199.
249. Act of 1740, § XLV, 1740 S.C. Acts 413.
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of the school's instructors were slaves owned by the Society. The
school continued to teach blacks, apparently without incident, until
1765, when the last Negro teacher died and the school was unable to
continue.
25
1
This pattern of ignoring unpopular slave laws continued through
the antebellum period. In 1834 the state legislature passed another law
that forbade slave owners from teaching their slaves to read and
write.2 51 At the time the law was passed, Samuel Jackson, a New Eng-
land Presbyterian minister who was traveling through South Carolina,
wrote the following:
A bill has just passed the [South Carolina] house forbidding to teach
the blacks to read, under severe penalties of fine & imprisonment. It
was brought forward by a Presbyterian, who is a professor of religion,
a new convert, & just elected attorney general. [The reference was to
Robert Barnwell Rhett, a leading nullifier.] Both parties are afraid
that the blacks will take an opportunity in these commotions to cut
their throats, yet they appear to disregard [the law] & not a word is
said about it in print or public.
2 52
Judge John Belton O'Neall was among those who openly called for the
law's repeal.
2 53
Similar attitudes prevailed toward regulations that governed the
slaves' dress. The Act of 1740 prohibited slaves from wearing fineries
and limited slave dress to livery or coarse clothing. The planters ig-
nored the law and the authorities never enforced it. In 1848 Judge
O'Neall advocated the law's repeal. 25' In addition, laws that forbade all
Negro religious meetings and interracial religious meetings2 5 were also
ignored. 258 Finally, slaves were given private garden plots despite laws
250. See A. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 14, at 200-01; G. ROGERS, Ja., supra note 17,
at 23.
251. Act of 1834, § I, 1834 S.C. Acts 468.
252. NULLIFICATION, supra note 59, at 165 (emphasis in original); see also E. GENO-
VESE, supra note 201, at 188 (describing the debate on whether slaves should be taught
to read and write in the context of religion).
253. See J. O'NEALL, supra note 210, at 23.
When we reflect, as Christians, how can we justify it, that a slave is not
to be permitted to read the Bible? It is in vain to say there is danger in it. The
best slaves in the State, are those who can and do read the Scriptures. Again,
who is it that teach your slaves to read? It generally is done by the children of
the owners. Who would tolerate an indictment against his son or daughter for
teaching a favorite slave to read?
Id. (emphasis in the original).
254. Id. at 24-25.
255. Act of 1800, §§ I-II, 1800 S.C. Acts 440-41.
256. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 40-41; J. O'NEALL, supra note 210, at 24.
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that forbade them to own property.2 57 Similarly, the facts of ex rel.
Sally v. Beaty reveal that slaves were permitted to own property, in-
cluding other slaves, directly violating the Act's provisions.25 8 In its de-
cision the Bynum v. Bostick court expressly referred to slave benefits
which were allowed to take effect sub silentio.
259
As the above discussion suggests, the primary difference between
customary and statutory law was that the statutes often ignored or de-
nied the slaves' humanity. In the day-to-day interaction between
master or overseer and slave, however, it was impossible to deny the
human element of the relationship. This fact created an additional ten-
sion between statutory and customary law. Under statutory law slaves
were treated primarily as chattels, deprived of almost all legal rights.
Under customary law slaves could secure customary rights that were
often respected by their masters.
26 0
According to Genovese, "[p]aternalism and slavery merged into a
single idea to the masters. But the slaves . . . acted consciously and
unconsciously to transform paternalism into a doctrine of protection of
their own rights--a doctrine that represented the negation of the idea
of slavery itself."2 1 The slave's ability to claim humanity made it im-
possible for the slave to remain nothing more than an extension of his
master's will,2"2 or a mere chattel, as he was defined under the statu-
tory system. Because "no reasonable formula could be devised to medi-
ate between counterclaims arising from the two sides of this dual sys-
tem, much had to be left outside the law altogether."26
Reflecting the fears of the low country planters who controlled
both houses of the state legislature, the statutory slave system became
increasingly harsh. Repression was used to make slavery absolute. In
contrast, slavery became less harsh under customary law. The amelio-
ration of the slave institution was reflected first in the customs of the
people and then in the legal system through the decisions of judges
and juries made up of white men of property. The presence of compet-
ing systems of slave law, combined with the apparently commonplace
disregard of unpopular slave statutes, may have allowed members of
the South Carolina Court of Appeals to pursue their proemancipation
policies.
The emancipation decisions resulted from many factors. The
emancipation issue permitted judges with very different views concern-
257. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 30.
258. For a discussion of Sally, see supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
259. For a discussion of Bynum, see supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
260. See E. GENOVESE, supra note 201, at 45-46.
261. Id. at 49.
262. See id. at 47.
263. Id.
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ing slavery to reach a consensus. The incremental law-making role
played by the judiciary, in contrast with the legislature's larger role,
permitted judges to make morally correct decisions without mounting a
broad attack on the institution of slavery. Contemporary perceptions
of the judicial role, accepted methods of statutory interpretation, and
competing systems of slave regulation all laid the foundation for the
emancipation decisions.
E. The Social, Economic, and Educational Background of the
South Carolina Decision Makers
The legislature was aware of the judicial trend that favored eman-
cipation. The Act of 1841 was clearly a response to the proemancipa-
tion decisions that preceded it. Although the South Carolina Legisla-
ture reorganized the courts twice during the late 1830s and the early
1850s, none of the court of appeals judges who voted in favor of eman-
cipation was removed. In fact, all of the court of appeals judges were
reappointed to the bench.
The unanswered question is why these judicial decisions were tol-
erated by the South Carolina Legislature during a time when there
were significant attempts to suppress open discussion of the slavery
issue. During the 1830s, political agitation in South Carolina was par-
ticularly pronounced. The nullification controversy had erupted. South
Carolina attempted to have the malls censored in an attempt to stop
the spread of abolitionist materials.264 The State also demanded that
the North take action to stop the antislavery movement. Public discus-
sion of slavery was silenced to the extent possible. When a South Caro-
lina journalist opened his newspaper to a "liberal and guarded" discus-
sion of slavery, a riot ensued.265 Freehling has suggested that as the
decade progressed, "to hint at colonization, to criticize the Negro
seamen law, to urge that slaves be allowed to read their Bibles-was
cause for mob justice. . . [The result was] the most thoroughgoing
repression of free thought, free speech, and a free press ever witnessed
in an American community.
2 66
If open discussion of slavery was suppressed, then why were the
emancipation decisions permissible at all? Why were the decisions not
silenced by impeachment, by reorganization of the courts with the ex-
clusion of the troublesome members, or by other means available to
the legislature? The decisions may have been tolerated because the
judges were members of an elite group that controlled South Carolina
264. See NV. FREEHLING, supra note 20, at 340.
265. See id., at 83-86.
266. Id. at 333.
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political life and directed the affairs of the state. Membership in this
exclusive club was limited to wealthy landowners.
26 7
At a time when other states were undergoing political reform that
provided for greater popular participation in the political process,
South Carolina continued with its traditional ways. Substantial prop-
erty ownership was required for holding public office, and most public
officials were elected by the state legislature. As a result, a select group
directed and controlled the affairs of the state. Common interests and
social bonds joined the members of this group: they were large prop-
erty holders; they were generally well educated; and they were mem-
bers of the same social groups and often were from the same families.
The names of the officials indicate that a select few held the important
offices of the state. The judges were no exception.
On a visit to South Carolina in the late 1830s G.W. Featherston-
haugh, a visitor from England, observed that the South Carolina plant-
ers considered themselves "the gentlemen of America.' '2 5 Featherston-
haugh further reported:
Some of them were very intelligent men, and hearty in their manners.
What particularly struck me at this dinner was the total want of cau-
tion and reserve in the ultra opinions they expressed about religion
and politics; on these topics their conversation was not at all ad-
dressed to me, but seemed to be a resumption of the opinions they
were accustomed to express whenever they met, and upon all occa-
sions .... It was quite new to me to hear men of the better class
express themselves openly against a republican government, and to
listen to discussions of great ability, the object of which was to show
that there never can be a good government if it is not administered by
gentlemen.
269
The scene described by the English visitor was a political debate
among members of the elite who openly expressed their desire to limit
participation in the political process to members of the select group.
267. The extent of the political influence wielded by this group can be understood
best by analyzing the structure of South Carolina government. Two conflicting theories
have been used to explain the structure of Southern antebellum governments. One view
maintains that Southern governments were so tightly controlled by a planter aristocracy
that representative democracy as we view it today did not emerge until after the Civil
War. A second theory holds that although Southern governments were dominated by the
planter class, representative democracy did exist, and elected officials were subject to the
control of and responsive to the interests of the general population. See generally F.
GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES 1776-1860, at 171-
296 (1930) (discussing Southern democracies). The first theory applies best to South
Carolina, a state that perhaps showed more concern with the form of a representative
democracy than with its substance.
268. NULLIFICATION, supra note 59, at 191 (emphasis in original).
269. Id. at 193.
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This group apparently believed that it was social or economic status,
rather than political philosophy, that provided the qualifications for
holding public office.
270
The social and political ties of the members of the state's judicial
and legislative branches remained strong during the antebellum period.
Although the South Carolina Constitution prohibited a judge from
holding another office during his judicial tenure, in fact, judges re-
tained strong links with the legislature. One reason is that they were
elected by the legislature. A second reason is that, as the biographies of
the judges suggest, election to the state legislature was an important
and perhaps essential step toward election to the judiciary. Of the
thirty-nine known judges and chancellors who served from 1779 to
1859, all but six served in the South Carolina Legislature before being
elected to the judiciary. Three of the six nonlegislators held other elec-
tive offices before becoming judges. Only three of the men advanced to
judgeships directly from the practice of law.
2 7 1
The close ties between the state legislature and the judiciary sug-
gest that South Carolina's government was controlled by a group of
men drawn from a narrow circle of political and social groups that had
a disproportionately large share of political power with respect to other
members of society.21 About seventy percent of these men were college
educated, many at South Carolina College in Columbia. For example,
Judges David Johnson and John B. O'Neall were classmates at the col-
lege, and Judge William Harper was also among its alumni. The Board
of Trustees of the college was regularly composed of such luminaries as
the state's governor, members of the state legislature, and members of
the judiciary.2"3 Occupations held by the South Carolina elite were
those of planter, lawyer, and professional politician.27 4 Not surpris-
ingly, many of them were related. Several of the elites of the 1830s
were the sons of the elites of the 1790s. Many were related by mar-
riage. 27 5 Of the social circles that existed, the South Carolina rice
planters constituted one of the closest knit and most aristocratic
270. See infra notes 272-85 and accompanying text.
271. The foregoing statistics were compiled from judges' biographical information
from the following sources: 1 U. BROOKS, supra note 198; 1 J. O'NEALL, supra note 93; 4
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY (1964 ed.); D. NORTON, A METHODOLOGICAL STUDY
OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA POLITICAL ELITE OF THE 1830's (1972) (unpublished thesis availa-
ble in University of Pennsylvania Library and Sterling Library, Yale University).
272. See generally D. NORTON, supra note 271, at 138-209 (identifying the political'
elite in South Carolina).
273. See id. at app. D.
274. Id. at 223.
275. See id. at 278-79.
[Vol. 42
62
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss3/3
S.C. SLAVE LAw
groups in the South.2 7 6
The importance of social position is illustrated by the planters' re-
action to the election of South Carolina's Governor Geddes. Geddes
was the son of a Charleston merchant. After serving in the South Caro-
lina House of Representatives, including two terms as Speaker of the
House, he was elected governor in 1818. The election of a member of
the mercantile class to the governorship alarmed the South Carolina
planter aristocracy.
277
The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 was amended in 1810 to
allow men who were not property owners to vote.27  The right to vote,
however, included only the right to vote for state legislators and repre-
sentatives to the United States Congress. The state legislature elected
all other government officials including the governor, superior court
judges, commissioners of the treasury, the secretary of state, and the
surveyor general.
279
Although property qualifications were removed as requirements
for suffrage, they were retained as qualifications for holding office.
Members of the South Carolina House of Representatives were re-
quired to own either an estate of 500 acres of land and ten slaves or
real estate valued at 150 sterling. 80 Senators were required to own es-
tates valued at 300 sterling free of debt.28 1 The qualifications for gover-
nor and lieutenant governor were an estate of 1500 sterling clear of
debt.
282
The property requirements for office combined with a representa-
tion formula based upon a district's free white population and taxable
wealth 283 allowed the state's wealthy property owners to control the
legislature. These men both controlled state policy and selected the
persons to administer it. Consequently, planters from the low country
controlled the Senate and held a disproportionate number of seats in
the House. Eleven tideland districts, with a total population of approx-
imately 78,000 whites, elected sixty-four Representatives and twenty-
eight Senators to the South Carolina Legislature. The remaining eigh-
276. Id. at 108.
277. See 2 J. 0'NEALL, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 209-10 (1859).
278. S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (amended December 19, 1810, 1810 S.C. Acts
184). Men who were not property holders had the additional requirement of being a
resident of their voting district for six months prior to the election and of paying a three
shilling tax in the previous year. Id.
279. Id. art. II, § 1, art. VI, § I (amended December 19, 1810, 1810 S.C. Acts 188,
190).
280. Id. art. I, § 6 (amended December 19, 1810, 1810 S.C. Acts 185).
281. Id. art. I, § 8 (amended December 19, 1810, 1810 S.C. Acts 186).
282. Id. art. II, §§ 2-3 (amended December 19, 1810, 1810 S.C. Acts 188).
283. See id. art. I, §§ 3, 7, 9 (amended December 17, 1808, 1810 S.C. Acts 193-94).
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teen districts, with a white population exceeding 181,000, elected only
sixty Representatives and seventeen Senators. A minority of less than
one third of South Carolina's white population thus controlled both
houses of the state's legislature. 28 ' One commentator observed that in
South Carolina a "share of the government was nigh [like] a heredita-
ment, and. . . a seat in the legislature, like a family pew descended to
the heir at law.
285
South Carolina's form of government probably was not one that
would be characterized as democratic. The state lacked stable, popu-
list-based political parties. Lines of contention typically were drawn
according to individual issues rather than along broader party lines.
Issues were often diffuse, and the voters were not presented with a
clear choice among candidates. 286 Election by the legislature to impor-
tant state offices turned on individual qualities and personal standing
within the community, rather than on party affiliation. For example, in
1824, the legislature that passed the Smith Resolutions proclaiming
federal protective tariffs unconstitutional elected Unionist John B.
O'Neall as Speaker of the House and chose another nationalist as gov-
ernor. Four years later, an even more adamant state rights legislature
elected O'Neall to a judgeship over states rights advocate Josiah Ev-
ans. 287 Similarly, in 1840, Unionist John Richardson defeated Nullifier
James Hammond in the election for governor.2 88 Thus, heated contro-
versy over important political issues often seemed to be intellectual de-
bates among fellows in a closed community. Their views did not seem
to jeopardize their opportunities for election or appointment to politi-
cal office. 2 9
284. See F. GREEN, supra note 267, at 262.
285. Id.
286. It was not until the 1830s during the Nullification Crisis that legislative divi-
sion3 resembling party lines began to emerge for the first time. See W. FREEHLING, supra
note 20, at 212-13.
287. Id. at 117-20.
288. See D. NORTON, supra note 271, at 131.
289. An editorial published in one of the state's leading newspapers, the South Car-
olinian, on December 7, 1838, offers insight into the political structure of the legislature.
The editorial stated:
We are much gratified to see the harmony which exists among our political
friends in the Legislature. All past distinctions on settled questions seem en-
tirely forgotten-the Union men and Nullifiers . . .are mingling together as
though such distinctions had never existed, and presenting a degree of general
harmony and unanimity never before witnessed in this State, or probably any
other. This is as it should be-showing as it does, that both parties have been
governed heretofore, as now, by 'principles, not men' and are ever ready with a
noble, disinterested and patriotic disregard of all selfish, personal or party con-
sideration, to support all who support their principles, and views of the public
good, and oppose all who oppose them no matter who. The result is most pro-
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During the 1830s and much of the antebellum period, other South-
ern states struggled over the question of whether an elite minority
should continue to control the majority. In response to populist agita-
tion, the Southern states, with the exception of South Carolina,
broadly extended suffrage and also provided for the direct election, by
the voters, of those offices that had formerly been elected by the legis-
lature. The turmoil caused by South Carolina's prolonged controversy
with the federal government, however, prompted South Carolina Nuli-
fiers, such as John C. Calhoun, to urge South Carolinians to suppress
their disquiet about local issues in order to strengthen the state's posi-
tion against the federal government. In 1838, in response to calls for a
popular election of the governor, Calhoun argued that concern over a
popular election of the governor would destroy the unanimity of the
state and would weaken its resistance to intrusion by the federal
government.2 90
The minority hold on the South Carolina government continued
until the Civil War. During the 1850s a group in South Carolina called
for equality of representation, popular election of the governor, and
limitation of judicial tenure. The only change made was the imposition
of a mandatory retirement age for judges. 291 The control of the state
remained in the grip of a few wealthy men.
The closed structure of the government, which consisted mostly of
legislators who were not bound to a political party, permitted dissent
to flourish within the group with an intensity that would not have been
permissible had the debates involved the general public. Dissent
among members of a closed group with common interests may not have
been perceived to be as threatening to domestic security and to the
state's independence from the federal government as a general public
discussion of these same issues would be.
The governing elite had doubts about letting the general public
participate in the determination of public policy. Although the elites
respected democracy, they were reluctant to extend it to the public at
large. While all free men could vote, only a few were qualified to par-
ticipate in the political process by holding public office. The controlling
group may have preferred to tolerate dissension among the inner circle
rather than to open the political process and the discussion of slavery
to the general public.
pitious to the State and honorable to its people; and presents a noble example
to our sister States. South Carolinian, Dec. 7, 1838, at 2, col. 2.
290. See generally F. GREEN, supra note 267, at 248-50 (describing the
lethargy of South Carolina in democratic reform).
291. See id. at 261.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The South Carolina statutes that restricted emancipation and the
judicial decisions that attempted to nullify them reveal the complexity
of nineteenth-century jurisprudence and the diversity of Southerners'
views on the issue of slavery. More importantly, however, the statutes
clearly indicate the impossibility of achieving justice when interactions
between individuals are based on stereotype and caricature. Early
South Carolina statutes portrayed slaves as too brutish to live as free
persons in a civilized society. The perpetuation of slavery was based on
force and repression. Slaves were clearly victims of the repressive sys-
tem. The system, however, also victimized the owners. As Judge Gas-
ton recognized, slavery poisoned the soul of the southern way of life.29 2
Customary law, in contrast, expressed a paternalistic view of blacks as
a people condemned to a state of perpetual childhood. The customary
justification for slavery was that the'enslaved were dependent and in-
capable of caring for themselves in a world of adults.
Both systems of slavery harmed the slaves and their owners. The
repressive approach discouraged interpersonal relations between the
two groups and revealed the basest human instincts of the master
class. The paternalistic view of slaves brought a different set of
problems. Although this view emphasized the human qualities of the
slaves, it denied their possibilities and their ability to be equal partici-
pants in a free society.
Of the two attitudes toward slaves, however, the paternalistic view
provided some opportunity for reform. It enabled owners to regard
their slaves as human beings, instead of mere property. It required
owners to be responsible for the care of their slaves. It forced owners to
face the brutal nature of the system and the brutalizing effects of slav-
ery on the owners themselves. It encouraged owners to express their
more humane instincts.
The most significant characteristic of the judicial decisions in
favor of emancipation is that, despite the personal views of the judges
who made them, the decisions implicitly rejected stereotypical views of
the slaves and instead focused on the competing claims of two human
beings. The cases were, as Judge Harper noted, disputes between indi-
viduals. 29 3 The language of the opinions suggests that the judges who
decided in favor of emancipation regarded the parties before the court
not as a free owner and a slave who was his property, but as individual
human beings with competing equitable interests. The decisions recog-
nized both the humanity and the adult status of the slaves. The lan-
292. See generally J. SCHAUINGER, supra note 218, at 166.
293. See generally Monk v. Jenkins, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 9, 14 (1834).
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guage of the opinions does not reveal any fear of the slaves about to be
freed or suggest that the slaves were incapable of participating in a free
society. The judges' ability, in those particular instances, to set aside
stereotypical views of slavery freed them to do justice in the matter at
hand.
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